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Military Intelligence



ANALYSIS

Military Intelligence

PB 34-92-1 JANUARY-MARCH 1992
Volume 18 Number 1

2 **Vantage Point**
4 **From the Editor**
5 **Letters**
36 **Proponent Notes**
39 **Total Force**
40 **Career Notes**
43 **Training Notes**
45 **Subscription Form**
48 **Professional Reading**

FEATURES

6 **Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century**
by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall
According to this author, our analytical system is failing to support commanders because we haven't learned to answer the all-important question of "So What?"

13 **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a Field Artillery Battalion**
by Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson
Initiative and good intelligence work keep combat soldiers alive—to include in the field artillery.

15 **Countersurveillance Operations**
by David Guaglianone
A former NTC chief of reconnaissance explains what every S2 should know about preventing enemy reconnaissance—how to keep enemy eyes away.

20 **Delusions of Grandeur: Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis**
by Captain Justin L. C. Eldridge
Preconceived personal or class bias can have devastating effects on analysis, as this historical example shows.

26 **The First Steps: Battalion S2s in World War I**
by Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Starting with the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, the author recounts how America's first modern intelligence system came into being, and shows that many of the precepts applied back then are still valid today.

32 **The New Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course**
by Colonel Robert B. Mangold
The Director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine gives us a look at the new MIOAC for the nineties and how the changes impact on the intelligence community.

36 **Your Career...What's Happening!**
by Colonel Lanning M. Porter, Major Robert A. Smith, and Captain Kelly A. Crosby
This article provides some invaluable tips on how to keep up with or get ahead of the competition for the fewer career opportunites that will exist in tomorrow's Army.

43 **The Commander's Weather Brief**
by Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett
Captain MacJarrett discusses the importance of the weather brief, and details how to graphically present it so the commander will remember it long after the briefing is over.

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VANTAGE POINT

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.

While this edition of our **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** concentrates on predictive analysis, I want to use this space to continue to keep you informed of major changes impacting our branch and our corps; and much has happened since our last **MIPB** issue.

We have seen the retirement of one senior MI general officer and the reassignment of several others. We have completed the MI Relook Study and have started to plan the implementation of those recommendations approved by its General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). We have begun a new and significantly different MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC), which will provide far better trained MI officers to the field and will cause some changes to MI officer personnel management. We have seen the launch of the Space Shuttle which carried into orbit an MI warrant officer from the Intelligence Center staff, as part of the first Military Man in Space (MMIS) experiment. And we are now seeing vertical construction rising from the soil of Fort Huachuca, as the facilities to accommodate the consolidation of the Intelligence School Devens at the home of MI begin to take shape.

General Officer Changes

Starting with general officer changes, as mentioned in our last issue, Lieutenant General Charles Eichelberger retired from the Army. In October, Lieutenant General Ira C. (Chuck) Owens replaced him. Major General Mike Pfister, formerly DCSINT of USAREUR, replaced Lieutenant General Owens as ADCSINT, DA. Replacing Major General Pfister in USAREUR is Brigadier General (Promotable) John F. Stewart, Jr. All other MI general officers will stay in place, at least for the time being.

MI Relook Study

The MI Relook Task Force, under the leadership of Brigadier General Stewart, finished its work in mid-September 91. The Task Force briefed its recommendations to a GOSC, co-chaired by the ADCSOPS-FD (Major General Granrud) and ADCSINT, DA (Major General Owens). The GOSC approved four recommendations of the Relook Team and deferred two others for additional study. The GOSC approved the following recommendations:

- ☐ Fix intelligence dissemination by first fielding proven nondevelopmental item of communications and automation, as the near term solution. Then integrate validated MI communications requirements into the objective Army communications architecture over time, as the long range solution.
- ☐ Develop an implementable imagery processing and dissemination architecture to support commanders across the force down to maneuver brigade.
- ☐ Correct the focus and balance of MI organizations across echelons and disciplines.
- ☐ Realign Army production responsibilities to meet future requirements in the face of changes being dictated by Defense Intelligence in the nineties, for example, the formation of Joint Intelligence Centers.

The two recommendations the GOSC deferred for further study include:

- ☐ Create a new linguist MOS for the Active Component as well as the Reserve Component; and establish a program with incentives to ensure we recruit, train, and retain sufficient linguists, fully qualified in the languages needed to support the Army's contingency responsibilities.
- ☐ Adopt a new strategy for creating a viable Reserve Component MI structure at division, corps, and EAC.

We at the Intelligence Center are responsible for developing implementation plans for the four approved recommendations. I have appointed Colonel Tom McLaulin, who was my senior representative on the Relook Task Force, to head a team which will include full-time representatives from HQ INSCOM and DCSINT, DA. Together, they will seek support from throughout our corps to develop implementation plans which will bring the approved Relook recommendations to fruition. In fact, some

(Continued on page 46)

Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

We can expect many changes as our Army reshapes itself. These next few years will see our Army draw down to a smaller, more highly trained force. Of course, the MI Corps will also feel the effects of the drawdown. These are going to be difficult times for those soldiers who have to transition to civilian life. With the help of our leadership, both officer and NCO, this transition can be less painful. Our soldiers and their families deserve your support.

One area where we'll see several changes is the retention of soldiers. You must remember reenlistment is a privilege and the Army will offer it only to those soldiers who demonstrate, through their performance and conduct, the potential for future development. Soldiers must reenlist when they're within 4 to 8 months of ETS. Once they are 3 months from ETS, as of January 1, 1992, they are ineligible for reenlistment without DA approval. Recent changes also require a bar to reenlistment for soldiers failing two consecutive APFTs, or making no satisfactory progress in the overweight program, or being removed for cause from NCOES. Bar reviews are now at 3 and 6 months.

Keep in mind the Army will reduce reenlistment options as it downsizes. Once a soldier is within the reenlistment window, current authorization will dictate options available. In addition, the Army will not authorize option F-3 (retrain for new MOS) for shortage or balanced MOSs without prior approval from DA.

These are just some of the policy changes that are effective now or will be in the future. It's important that our NCOs stay on top of these changes. The new changes will ensure only the very best are allowed to stay in the Army.

Again, the interim change to AR 601-280, Total Army Retention Program, is out. This interim change provides new policy for qualification for discharge, immediate reenlistment, immediate reenlistment eligibility, extension action, and length-of-service requirements. It mandates bar to reenlistment proceedings on some soldiers and makes numerous administrative changes.

We will have our Command Sergeants Major/G2 Sergeants Major Training Conference from February 16 to 21. February 21 is set aside for Command Sergeant McKnight and the INSCOM Sergeants Major. Hope to see as many attend as possible. It's very important that you be kept informed of the many changes taking place in MI.



FROM THE EDITOR

Happy New Year!

A key lesson that we, as Military Intelligence professionals, learned in DESERT STORM was that we need to do a better job at predictive analysis. Intelligence analysis needs to forecast future events, and not simply reiterate past events. That is the feature topic of this issue.

Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall's article tells us how to move from simple analysis to the more difficult task of synthesis: Completing a picture by tying together information we already have, and making logical predictions from that information. His ideas and suggestions are in line with the measures the MI community is implementing to train our analysts to predict.

To successfully predict events, an analyst must take the initiative to taylor information to his needs. Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett shares with us a way he has structured weather information to make it a more useful tool for decision making. Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson shows us how he modified the doctrinal IPB process to make it useful in support of field artillery battalions. Both articles are good examples of how an analyst, with a little common sense and initiative, can ensure he provides his commander with useful, predictive estimates.

Finally, articles by Captains Michael Bigelow and Justin L. C. Eldridge provide historical examples of past lessons learned in collection and analysis. While both relate to our feature topic, they also stand alone as interesting, informative glimpses into the history of intelligence.

In closing, congratulations to our Writer of the Year, Captain Michael Bigelow; our Runner-up, USAR Captain Aaron Danis; and Honorable Mention Winners Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles VanNederveen.

Writer of the Year Award

The **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin** is pleased to announce that **Captain Michael E. Bigelow** is the winner of our Sixth Annual Writer of the Year Award. The time period of this award is October 1990 through December 1991.

Captain Bigelow's articles, "Van Deman" (October-December 1990), "Eisenhower and Intelligence" (January-March 1991), and "The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis" (April-June 1991) earn him this award for 1991. **MIPB** has also published six book reviews by Captain Bigelow during the judging period.

Runner-up for this award is Captain (USAR) Aaron Danis for his articles, "Afghanistan Revisted: Soviet Lessons Learned" (October-December 1990) and "Iraqi Army: Operations and Doctrine" (April-June 1991). Captain Danis is also a regular contributor to our Professional Reading section.

Honorable mentions go to Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles Van Nederveen for their prolific contributions to our Professional Reading section.

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

The article, "Small Scale Agriculture: How the United States Can Win the Drug War," leaves a false impression to those not involved in counter-drug operations. The fact is the premise of the article is wrong: Small scale agriculture will not win the drug war, nor will eradication programs, nor any other program focused on the coca farmer. The only place for any of these programs is as part of a larger, more comprehensive strategy focused on eliminating demand at all stages of the cocaine production process. As long as there is a demand, and therefore profit, someone will grow coca and produce cocaine.

Captain Ligon presents a valid argument for using the Benson Institute's agriculture program to improve the small farmer's nutrition intake, and he's correct in stating the positive effect it would have on campesino-government relations.

But he overstates the value of the small farmer in the process when he calls him the "strategic center of gravity," and he ignores the basic reason the small farmer grows coca, which is money.

Besides the fact the average coca farmer sees nothing inherently wrong with growing coca (it's been used in the Andean ridge countries for centuries), the bottom line is he can make more money growing coca than other food or cash crops. The drug trade is capitalistic to the core and is gov-erned by the law of supply and de-mand. It's true if he can feed his family and make money growing food he'll be happy, but he'll be happier if he can grow food and make more money growing coca. The only time we saw farmers in the Chapare region of Bolivia stop growing coca was when the price of the leaf fell below the cost to produce it. This led many farmers to join the government's eradication program and led others to leave the valley.

But even this local (tactical) success is transitory without a prolonged demand cut in user countries. Without this, local prices will rise again when the price of a kilo of cocaine rises in the U.S. and Europe in response to the reduced availability of cocaine.

Besides politics, as noted in the article, another factor that limits our ability to deal with the coca farmer is the fact that coca can be grown in other areas besides Peru and Bolivia. Already there is some coca growing in Colombia and coca can also be grown at Brazil's lower elevations. True, it takes more effort to process this coca, but if there is demand for cocaine, there will be money to be made.

His recommendation for the development of a realistic agriculture program to help the farmer is good. Programs designed to persuade farmers to stop growing coca have their place and they do increase the trafficker's difficulty in producing cocaine. Like so many other elements of the counter-drug war, it is often a patch-work of many efforts that lead to success. But it is wrong to believe that focusing on the farmer, as the article states, would have a significant impact on the drug trade.

And it's not over yet. Consider the increased use of heroin in the United States and the increased production of that drug in response to demand. Already, the Cali Cartel is growing and processing poppies for this "new" cash crop.

Major Raymond W. Levesque
Chief, Counter-Drug Tactical
Analysis Team
Panama

P.S. I also was in charge of the counter-drug tactical analysis team in Bolivia for a year.

Dear Editor:

I have some disagreement with Captain David Collins' (USAF) article in July-September **MIPB** on "MI in Low-Intensity Conflict."

The first of the operational categories of LIC is not "counterinsurgency operations," as Captain Collins indicates. U.S. Army doctrine states the first category is "support for insurgency and counterinsurgency" (FM 100-20, p. 1-10).

Captain Collins also says that U.S. forces may prevent escalation, as in the "peacekeeping role." Army doctrine says that peacekeeping forces maintain a peace already achieved diplomatically, and are usually forbidden to use force at all, except in self-defense (FM 100-20, p. 1-11).

Finally, Captain Collins lists the final LIC imperative as "legitimacy of effort." Legitimacy of **effort** implies something operational; but according to Army doctrine, the LIC imperative "legitimacy" has nothing at all to do with operations, and everything to do with politics. The "legitimacy" referred to is the legitimacy of the government in question in the eyes of its own people (FM 100-20, p. 1-9).

These three errors are minor in and of themselves. I'm not trying to dance with Captain Collins on the heads of pins. The problem is that these errors, in fact, reflect a preoccupation throughout the article with **military operations**. Each error is a misunderstanding of doctrine slanted toward a military interpretation of what remains at heart a political problem.

While Captain Collins pays homage to the idea that LIC is a political end that may end employing armed means, virtually his entire discussion focuses on the means, ignoring the end. In order for MI to function effectively in a LIC environment, we have to internalize a number of hard realities:

- We can't "deter" a guerrilla war like we deterred Soviet aggression for 50 years. LICs occur because of economic and social injustice. You can **repress** the desire for justice; you can only eliminate unrest caused by it, by **meeting the needs of the people**.
- To do that, we need long-range strategic vision and long-term HUMINT intelligence [*sic*] systems to

(Continued on page 47)

INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS
IN THE 21st CENTURY

Many things, having full reference to one consent, may work contrariously: As many arrows loosed several ways, come to one mark; As many ways meet in one town; As many fresh streams meet in one salt sea; As many lines close in the dial's center; So may a thousand actions, once a foot, end in one purpose....

William Shakespeare

By Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall

The situation...An order of battle analyst is briefing a division commanding general. The briefer is relating findings from the interrogation of an enemy prisoner. The analyst gives the general many one-line sentences describing what the prisoner said. The analyst then abruptly changes topics and moves on to the enemy situation shown on the briefing map. The general, with a perplexed look on his face, says with irritation, "Wait a minute. What does all that information from the prisoner **mean?**"

To a commander in a modern battle situation, the question "what does it mean" frequently arises. He's constantly bombarded with fragmentary information from a seemingly chaotic battlefield. How does he interpret information; what does it mean? How does he assemble it into a coherent picture?

The commander has many information gathering resources. He has endless opportunities to make decisions and to understand the enemy, weather, and terrain. But how does he use the information to make sound battlefield decisions? How does he use his resources to the best advantage, to know what's happening, and to determine how to direct or redirect events to satisfy his intent?

The U.S. Army's intelligence system worked exceptionally well during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It was a major contributor to victory and to the unbelievably low casualty count. However, as well as it worked, we must improve on one area of the intelligence system: Its ability to make information **mean** something.

Battlefield experience shows that, to be of maximum benefit, the end product of intelligence analysis should not be analysis, which is studying something to understand its nature. Instead, the end product should be synthesis, which is combining analyzed information into a coherent whole, thereby drawing a conclusion. Analysis and synthesis involve the highest and most difficult levels of thinking.

Going from singularly focused traditional analysis to synthesis as an end product creates new possibilities. Using synthesis, analysts can make intelligent predictions, gain insight, and discern complex relationships. The new process recognizes inextricable, complex relationships: Analysis and synthesis, analysis and collection management, collection management and synthesis, to name a few.

Analysts who follow this process use a disciplined approach to seeking and understanding information. They use structured thinking and tasking to relate collected information to the commander's concept of the operation.

To achieve synthesis, the analyst must understand and act upon fundamental concepts:

- ☐ To be meaningful, intelligence collection has to focus on the commander's information requirements.
- ☐ The analyst must learn to ask specific questions which will provide specific information.
- ☐ The analyst must do some analysis before tasking, to understand the relative value of information as it arrives, before synthesizing it.
- ☐ Intelligence analysts cannot be dull, uninquisitive purveyors of information, who simply provide it to the commander and expect **him** to find meaning. Instead, they have to deduce the meaning, provide it to the commander, and make the difficult predictions themselves.
- ☐ This entire approach must be holistic.

A holistic approach is based on wholes, which nest within one another. Wholes aren't usually discrete entities; they relate to other entities. Analysts, using mental energy, can discover these wholes and the links which bind them together.

Theory

Even the most seemingly insignificant piece of information has potential power. To release this power, an analyst must relate the piece of information to other pieces. The analyst must assess the information for complicated relationships, then synthesize it into a whole. The seemingly insignificant act of recognizing that each and every piece of information has potential power is critical: It is the needed first step to understanding and implementing synthesis.

What are wholes? Wholes are mental and physi-

cal constructs. Wholes represent things (physical) and ideas or concepts (mental). Wholes are composed of smaller wholes and comprise larger wholes. Related wholes are linked together and have overlapping boundaries.

Wholes are composed of bits and pieces of information. We can't find or develop complete wholes, only varying degrees of partial wholes. Partially complete wholes, however, provide us with an explicit power: The power to predict. By determining probabilities and predicting, we can use a partial whole to form conclusions about a complete whole. When we understand these concepts, we gain an entirely new perspective of understanding.

We can easily apply the theory of wholes to intelligence collection and analysis. The focus of most military endeavors is the enemy. Every organized force has an order of battle. This appears as a hierarchical series of connected wholes. Also, the functions of enemy battlefield operating systems appear as wholes, reaching horizontally and vertically. Additionally, an enemy's C^2 nodes appear as wholes, connecting below, above, and laterally. Those wholes then become the focus of our intelligence collection and analysis.

Indicators and specific information requirements (SIRs) analyses, discussed in Army intelligence doctrine, are techniques we use to task collection systems for information. SIRs are detailed questions whose answers identify specific types of activity, technical data (like frequencies and call signs), and types of information we want the collection system to find. We analyze these by first viewing a series of wholes of the environment under study.

"Synthesis is the end product of the analytical effort. It enables us to conclude, predict, and understand."

For example, take any of the above mentioned wholes (order of battle, battlefield operating systems, nodes). Analyze your intelligence indicators and SIRs. Then concentrate collectors to find information related to the whole. This produces focused, relevant, and disciplined collection. Once the information returns, you must synthesize it into wholes, give understanding and coherency to otherwise confusing data, and predict, perhaps even shape, the future.

Analysis is always important to understanding information. Analysis involves pulling something apart and examining each of the parts. It lets us thoroughly understand parts of wholes, and then task correctly. This is the process we use when we analyze indicators and SIRs to develop specific taskings. Using such analyses to focus tasking links collection and analysis to the commander's information requirements.

Synthesis means putting pieces of information into a coherent, meaningful whole, the parts of which fit together. Synthesis results in understanding the whole and making predictions from that whole. Synthesis is the end product of the analytical effort. It enables us to conclude, predict, and understand. By-products in the march toward achieving synthesis include performing trend and pattern analyses, and identifying and understanding relationships.

Analysts study information to understand it. Through understanding, analysts can synthesize (combine) the analyzed information into a relevant and coherent whole. From the whole, analysts can discern other wholes, develop them further, predict outcomes or intentions, and understand even more complex phenomena.

Current State of Nature

In practice, Army intelligence analysts usually don't synthesize well. There are several reasons for this shortfall. Many of our officer and enlisted analysts don't know how to discipline their minds to achieve the higher-level thinking synthesis requires. Typically, they do well when they concentrate on what they know how to do: Analyze.

"Another point is that people rarely think about thinking—how they think, how their commanders think, and what the results of thinking should be."

Synthesis, though, is a higher step in the process of thinking. It's difficult to do and difficult to learn. Additionally, our doctrine doesn't explain how to go through such a sophisticated mental process. In fact, our intelligence doctrine doesn't discuss either synthesis or the effect of synthesizing information into wholes.

Another point is that people rarely think about **thinking**—how they think, how their commanders think, and what the results of thinking should be. When a person neither knows how nor what the

results of thinking should be, it's difficult to engage in higher-level thought.

Last, in the absence of concrete guidance or structure, analysts generally don't do well in forming conclusions and in discerning relevancy. They often have trouble understanding relationships between collection, information, and combat power. They sometimes have difficulty figuring out relationships among seemingly unconnected pieces of information and in forming fragments of information into a coherent whole.

To synthesize (develop a whole), we need bright people with intellect, perspective, and understanding. Developing thinkers who synthesize is a challenge for several reasons. Synthesis requires performing relatively abstract mental functions, which can be difficult to learn. Typically, the mind performs only one task at a time. But synthesis requires collapsing multiple functions together to see images of the whole. It requires performing multiple tasks at one time; it requires thinkers who understand relevance and trends. Those who synthesize first analyze, making the two mental functions inseparable. Many people appear highly skilled at one function, but usually not at both.

It's easy to understand why Army analysts have difficulty progressing from analysis to synthesis. Analysts are often caught up in the following types of problems. Those who perpetuate these problems inhibit, or completely thwart, the analyst's attempts to synthesize, even when he has the ability.

- ☐ Good analysis is not simple bean counting. Numbers of tubes and tanks are nice to know but only in the context of higher meaning. What is relevant about the number? How do their systems compare against ours numerically, in quality, in gun-crew training, and in a variety of problem settings? How does the enemy intend to use these systems? How do the systems mesh in combined arms operations? Answering these questions forces analysts to do more than simply show the commander gross numbers of systems and shower him with disjointed data.

"This approach is not analysis—nor is it helpful. The job of MI analysts is to be honest brokers."

- ☐ Good analysis is not regurgitating what a source has revealed. Instead, the analyst must tell the commander what the information means and what it implies for making decisions. Some intelligence officers believe in and openly advocate just giving decision makers uninterpreted facts. This approach is not analysis—nor is it helpful. The job of MI analysts is to be honest brokers—soldiers who provide meaning from an enemy perspective and help the commander make decisions by identifying enemy intentions, efforts to surprise, courses of action, and vulnerabilities for friendly forces to attack.
- ☐ Good analysis is not repeating a higher-level analyst's ideas. Analysts must assess information from higher headquarters and place it in proper perspective. Analysts look at what information obtained from a higher-level asset for higher-level purposes means at their levels. A good analyst can infer from the information and discern trends or implications which affect his commander or the command. Repeating macro-information is inappropriate unless it makes sense at our level and from our perspective.
- ☐ Good analysis is not being myopic. A good working knowledge of what is happening at lower and higher levels and how friendly forces operate fuels good analysis. In this respect, good analysis depends on information coming from good questions that form taskings.
- ☐ Good analysis cannot exist in either a stovepipe or a vacuum. SIGINT analysts, for example, sometimes operate in a SIGINT stovepipe. SIGINTers have been known to be perfectly happy collecting technical data, passing it up and down the SIGINT channels, but never once trying to figure out relationships, patterns, meaning, and relevance—what the data means. Such stovepiped processes serve no purpose other than to create information for other SIGINT analysts. SIGINT information goes to the G2, who fuses information from all three disciplines into intelligence.

To get from analysis, the fundamental building block of good collection, to synthesis—that which makes information useful—the analyst can use the following points as a framework.

- ☐ Good analysis searches for and identifies trends. Seeing and identifying trends are critical skills; if we can see a trend in an opponent's activities, we can use the trend to form a conclusion about the future. The analyst should have a mind for detail and a good memory to identify trends. Trend

analysis, in combination with other information, is a valuable tool.

"The analyst must always be inquisitive; always on the lookout for good, relevant mysteries and unanswered questions."

- ☐ Good analysis identifies mysteries. The analyst must always be inquisitive; always on the lookout for good, relevant mysteries and unanswered questions. They generate collection. They can generate hypotheses that successful analysts will attempt to confirm or deny, by combining obtained information with good thinking.
- ☐ Good analysis causes theories to surface. Some type of rational explanation must exist to explain the presence of phenomena. Theories merely explain why a person believes an event has occurred. Thus, theories serve as a catalyst to seek more information to prove or disprove a theory.
- ☐ Good analysis forces disciplined thinking. Analysts organize their way of developing requirements and tasking assets to satisfy those requirements. Good analysts then study information fragments in detail and cause them to gel into a meaningful whole. The study is itself a disciplined process. Even if the analyst has a flash of intuition, good, disciplined thinking serves to prove intuition and to help the decision maker understand the analyst's position. Intuitive thinkers have to substantiate their intuition with sound reasoning.
- ☐ Good analysis causes reflection. Reflection occurs when the analyst thinks about information. The act of reflecting causes the analyst to search for meaning, to identify relationships, to understand cause and effect and, most importantly, to develop insight. Insight is a marvelous phenomenon through which an analyst gains understanding by thinking about why something occurs, the relationships that influence an activity or phenomenon, and stimuli that influence an activity.

Desired State of Nature

Figure 1 shows a path analysts can take for disciplined thinking and synthesis. The path is just a framework for thinking about complicated mental tasks, not dogma analysts must adhere to. The process, as shown in Figure 1, leads to synthesis. Its underlying theory calls for analysts to—

- ☐ Study requirements through analysis.
- ☐ Task collection systems to satisfy requirements.
- ☐ Receive fragments of information.
- ☐ Put the fragments into a coherent whole.

This process requires significant mental effort. Analysts must understand target and situation development, IPB, collection planning, relationships between connecting parts of the intelligence system, the requirements, and the thinking process. Analysts also have to understand relationships among targeting and situation development, high payoff targets and concepts of operation, and collection and AirLand Operations doctrine.

Analysts also need to know what the terms "constraint" and "imperfection" mean. Everything we do is **constrained** and nothing is **perfect**. Thus, even our greatest efforts at collection, analysis, and synthesis will be constrained and imperfect.

Generally, the process chart requires analysts to identify the commander's information needs and to focus their intellectual energy to satisfy those needs. We're supposed to tear information requirements apart, then ask questions about the parts. We ask the collection system to find **relevant** information. When information starts flowing, we sift through irrelevant information, then synthesize relevant information relating to the commander's concept of the operation.



Figure 1. A path to synthesis.

Computer Graphics:
Kazuko Klever

As we progress through the process chart, analysts form conclusions to integrate into wholes. They also seek to complete portions of wholes through additional tasking and requests for intelligence information. Coherency is important to any mental activity. Its presence becomes obvious because of the process we used to task our information-collection systems and the continuous, systematic linkage of collection and analysis to the commander's requirements.

Implementing this methodology is a significant task. Many variables have to merge before synthesis can occur and be effective. One variable is the commander—his understanding of the mission, his understanding of his own thought processes (synthesis or induction), and his description of his information requirements.

Another variable is the intelligence people—do they understand friendly and enemy operations well enough to think and ask pertinent questions. Further, intelligence analysts must apply needed technical data to task our intelligence systems to answer questions directly related to the commander's information needs.

"Analysts need to be sharp enough to understand relationships, integrate fragments of information, discover insights, and make conclusions through synthesis."

Analysts need to be sharp enough to understand relationships, integrate fragments of information, discover insights, and make conclusions through synthesis. They must be able to articulate their view of the whole and how they arrived at their conclusions. Further, analysts need to relate their whole to other co-equal, larger or smaller wholes, to understand the total environment.

For this to work, we must use three basic concepts to guide our mental processes:

- ☐ We have to develop an environment for synthesis to occur. We have to destroy or modify the old environment's anachronistic ways of thinking, and create new environments that can support the higher-level thinking processes synthesis requires.
- ☐ Understanding must be our goal. We have to engage in synthesis and holistic thinking to approach understanding. If we continue to focus on analytical pieces only, we'll be intellectually bound to sluggish thinking. On the other hand, if we learn to use synthesis the shackles of limitation will fall away. We'll discover it can lead to brilliant rather than sluggish thinking.
- ☐ We have to help our subordinates develop their higher-level thinking skills. Most people can learn to synthesize through practice and hard thinking. The process of turning analysis into synthesis is complex, but entirely possible.

Conclusion

An additional and virtually unexploited battlefield dimension is the mind. There is no limit to what we can accomplish with our minds. We can understand complex phenomena, discern relationships, and form information fragments into coherent wholes. The medium for expansion is higher-level thinking—synthesis.

Two thoughts sum up the importance of synthesis: First, intelligence work is not just about analysis; it's about coherent wholes, how these wholes complement each other and link together, and what they mean. Second, Army intelligence analysts need a structure to guide how they think—not a cookie-cutter to tell them what to think, but a process to help them understand **how** to think.

We need to reorient ourselves to search for more meaning and more relevancy through synthesis. Synthesis is a powerful tool in the quest to become better thinkers. We can learn and teach synthesis, but we have to embed its framework in our doctrine, in our training, and in our intelligence processes. We need to create environments to promote the growth and development of synthesis.

Synthesis and analytical thinking go hand-in-hand in the intelligence business. In the past, we relied heavily on analysis. We now need to take the next step, placing more emphasis on synthesis. With continued good analysis and synthesis, we can expand our minds and create our future. We can shape the 21st Century rather than allowing its powerful forces to shape us.

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INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

By Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson

How does an MI officer provide tactical intelligence support to a field artillery battalion?

This, perhaps, is a moot question because current tables of organization and equipment don't allow for MI officers at the artillery battalion level. However, I believe this question is pertinent because artillery battalions often find ways to get MI officers. I want to share techniques I've developed for applying IPB to field artillery.

I developed these techniques while serving in Korea as the battlefield intelligence coordinator (BIC) in 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2d Infantry Division. The 1-15 FA is a 155-millimeter self-propelled battalion with a direct support mission.



As MI officers, we're all familiar with the five steps of the IPB process. In MIOBC we received extensive training on how to use this systematic and continuous approach to developing enemy courses of action. We learned to apply these steps within an infantry and armor mission context. We spent little time applying IPB to field artillery.

"MI professionals have the greatest impact on... survivability..."

A direct support FA battalion's mission is to provide close supporting fire to its maneuver brigade. To the brigade commander, this is the artillery officer's function, with an underlying mission of keeping the firing batteries alive to provide this support. MI professionals have the greatest impact on this underlying survivability mission.

FA shoots where the assets with "eyes" on the battlefield tell it to shoot. Artillery batteries have tremendous expertise in that area and a variety of resources skilled in target analysis, planning, and fire support coordination. In fact, the maneuver battalion and brigade S2s do most of these tasks with the battalion and brigade fire support officers (FSOs). These maneuver S2/FSO teams look at the enemy beyond the forward line of own troops.

As the BIC in an artillery battalion, I soon experienced the frustration of trying to develop a decision support template (DST) meant to drive the maneuver battle. The crux of this frustration was that the maneuver commander, not the artillery battalion commander, decides where the battle will go. So, as a BIC, I had a choice: Continue to produce fabulous products for a battle my commander doesn't control, or bend the IPB process to the task of fighting the counterfire and force preservation battle.

As an artillery BIC, I must still keep track of the forward battle since the battalion intelligence section provides search and queuing information to the fire finder radar section. I tell the radar where and when to radiate so my battalion can find the enemy artillery, shoot it, and kill it. All the while, I keep an eye on the total radiation time so the enemy has less of a chance to acquire and kill my radar.

The real challenge is to develop a DST to watch the rear battle. I focus the event template, with its time phase lines (TPLs) and named areas of interest (NAIs), on the rear battle. The DST must show the artillery battalion commander where to make critical decisions—when and where to move batteries in order to evade the enemy operating in the rear area.

To do this, I start labeling my TPLs at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and move toward the rear. As the FEBA shifts, so too must these TPLs. I select my NAIs to track enemy elements in the rear, either units that break through from the front, or those that just pop up in the rear, like special operations forces.

In developing the DST, I place emphasis on coordinating with MP units and support battalions—units which share the FA's immediate concern for rear area security. When creating the collection plan, I realize that, because they're out front, it's not feasible to task scouts, fire support teams, and combat observation and long range surveillance teams with NAI coverage. Instead, I turn to MPs at traffic control points, perimeter guards at battalion supply operations centers, and air defense units protecting the rear, to get eyes on those NAIs.

Once the DST is hammered out with the S3 and the collection plan is ready, I turn to the brigade and division artillery S2s. I deliver the collection plan with a request for tasking to these S2s, with a special request that it also go to the division rear area G2.

From this description, you can see the five steps of IPB are followed, but simply applied differently in a field artillery battalion.

A new technique is to shift the focus of IPB from the battle out front to the rear battle. At first it will seem very difficult. You must deal with agencies most combat arms units don't focus on during operations. You must talk to them on nets most battalion tactical operations centers don't usually talk on. As the process becomes more familiar, mutual awkwardness wears away. A big help is face-to-face coordination with higher unit S2s so they understand what you're doing.

I tested these techniques during force-on-force maneuver/FA exercise evaluations and the 1991 Team Spirit exercise. The results were great. We never lost a howitzer due to being overrun or attacked by enemy special operations units. We had the lowest percentage of losses to counterfire. We were able to support the brigade with fires longer because the artillery battalion commander had the confidence to keep his batteries forward, even during phases of rapid withdrawal. This technique works. I invite you to try it.

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COUNTERSURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

By David Guaglianone

It's the day before the attack. Somewhere in the Mojave Desert, soldiers of the OPFOR's 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment prepare for the morning assault. At the tactical operations center (TOC), officers gather for the operations order. The Chief of Reconnaissance (COR) is about to brief the situational overlay, and he's pleased with his assessment of the enemy. As usual, he has an almost complete picture of the Blue Force defense before the battle begins. He has this picture for one reason only: His surveillance operations have been successful.

His reconnaissance and surveillance plan ensured intelligence coverage of the Blue Force sector. And now, the OPFOR has eyes on each battle position—the tank reserve, the brigade support area, and even the TOC. Armed with this knowledge, the regiment has little difficulty tearing through the defense.

Knowing is half the battle. This is why so much time and effort are spent on reconnaissance and surveillance. Maneuver commanders need to know as much as possible about the enemy. They especiallly must know when the enemy is preparing a deliberate defense. It is equally important that a defending commander prevent his opponent from gaining this knowledge: Prevention is the task of counterreconnaissance and countersurveillance.

Unfortunately, there isn't enough emphasis on countersurveillance. But if a defensive scheme is going to work, a unit must have an effective countersurveillance plan, one incorporating all three phases of countersurveillance operations:

- ☐ Infiltration and insertion prevention.
- ☐ Position detection.
- ☐ Countermeasures.

Infiltration and Insertion Prevention

As an S2, your first line of defense in countering enemy surveillance is simply to prevent his ground vehicles from entering your sector by establishing a screen line well in front of the defense. If the screen force is successful, the enemy won't be able to infiltrate surveillance teams by ground vehicles.

You must also prepare to deal with helicopter infiltrations. You must plan to counter aerial insertion along or through air avenues of approach. After analyzing the terrain, select air defense positions that will prevent enemy helicopters from reaching areas the enemy wants to use for surveillance positions. In addition, position ground vehicles with machine guns or small arms fire teams to destroy infiltrating helicopters.

These tactics are especially effective in mountain

or desert regions where you have increased visibility and weapons coverage. At NTC, an M-60 machine gun team in the right place can keep a helicopter from completing an insertion over areas often limited only by the range of weapons. Clearly, effective screening and active air defense help squelch infiltrations.

Dismounted infiltrations are more difficult to counter than mounted ones. One way to detect them is to use ground surveillance radars (GSRs). GSRs can augment the mounted screen force.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) helps you select optimum locations for GSRs. The screen force commander may use these assets directly or the S2 may control them. In both cases, as S2, you must have overall responsibility for the screen operation. You should be in contact with the screen force commander and any other asset preventing infiltrations.

Another asset you may use are line companies' dismounted patrols. They're effective in securing close terrain and preventing dismounted infiltrations. Again, you must control these patrols so you can coordinate and synchronize operations. Centralized control helps you disseminate information rapidly and unify your collection efforts.

Electronic warfare (EW) assets can detect infiltrating enemy units. When they do, send a screen vehicle, or preferably a reaction force vehicle, to capture or kill the enemy.

Indirect fire systems assist your operations. Mortars quickly and effectively neutralize infiltrating units. The advantage of using artillery or mortars is that you can watch the impact without having to risk a screen vehicle. Whenever a screen vehicle displaces, it leaves a gap that, unless covered, will remain until the vehicle returns. With indirect fire, you can positively confirm destruction, and keep the screen vehicle watching vigilantly.

Ambushes are useful in countersurveillance operations, if METT-T factors allow. (The METT-T factors are mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available.) Establish ambushes in key areas to augment the screening operation. Place them along routes likely to be used to insert surveillance teams. Keep in mind, the enemy's surveillance insertion routes differ greatly from his probable reconnaissance routes. So the best ambush sites may be along routes that offer little to enemy reconnaissance.

Hence, the planning criteria for counterinfiltration ambushes are different from those for counterreconnaissance ambushes. In counterreconnaissance, the objective is to keep the enemy from getting information. In infiltration and insertion prevention operations, the objective is to keep the enemy from getting to surveillance positions.

If you keep the enemy from infiltrating, you keep him from establishing surveillance positions. However, if he does infiltrate, it doesn't necessarily follow that he'll succeed in establishing surveillance positions. You can still prevent the surveillance team from functioning effectively.

"The key to countersurveillance is understanding that the enemy will try to establish positions in areas providing maximum coverage and survivability."

One way to prevent surveillance is to use countersurveillance sentries at night. Using IPB, you select positions where the enemy is likely to attempt to insert and establish surveillance teams. Then place friendly sentries at these positions. For instance, you identify a ridge line, mountain peak, and hilltop as areas where enemy surveillance teams could operate. Then send your own countersurveillance sentries to guard these areas. If the enemy attempts a heliborne insertion, the sentries are in position to either destroy the helicopter or kill the soldiers. Likewise, sentries may be in position to capture or kill an enemy surveillance team after it

leaves its vehicle.

The key to countersurveillance is understanding that the enemy will try to establish positions in areas providing maximum coverage and survivability. Since these areas are obvious in mountain or desert regions, sentries guard them very effectively. If possible, sentries should have night vision devices, and should reconnoiter key terrain to identify routes, fields of fire, ambush positions, and alternate sentry sites. If sentries hear helicopters, they should inform you so the area can be searched. You should also coordinate fire support with the fire support officer (FSO).

You can use mine fields to impede insertions. Place mines on any hill slope a surveillance team might use to reach a peak or other vantage point. Use trip flares or remote early warning systems, such as REMBASS, to detect a surveillance team's movements before they've established their positions.

"During terrain sweeps, helicopters should carry at least one observer, or more if density or altitude limitations don't exist."

Position Detection

If the enemy infiltrates and inserts surveillance teams, they must be found. You must now assume the enemy surveillance teams are fully established and may be reporting. An enemy team sending traffic must be silenced as soon as possible, because, at this point, the enemy team is becoming increasingly familiar with friendly activities and intentions.

There are four ways to detect enemy surveillance positions:

- ☐ Electronic detection.
- ☐ Terrain sweeps.
- ☐ Chance encounters.
- ☐ Other intelligence methods.

Electronic detection. EW assets detect enemy surveillance positions by direction finding. They can also find the frequency the team is using. You should use EW assets early in the operation to capitalize on the first radio transmissions. The EW operations center should pass positions, frequencies, and significant radio messages to you immediately.

Terrain sweeps. Always conduct terrain sweeps to detect enemy surveillance positions. Use dismounted troops or helicopters, if available. Heliborne sweeps are extremely effective in mountain and desert regions without vegetation, because these areas offer little natural concealment. Helicopters can sweep vast areas and operate close to the ground.

During terrain sweeps, helicopters should carry at least one observer or more if density or altitude limitations don't exist. When the observer detects enemy surveillance teams, he reports the position and marks it with smoke so ground units can take action. Although the helicopter may be able to kill the surveillance team, this isn't always advisable, since helicopters are extremely vulnerable to small arms fire.

After you identify the enemy's probable surveillance positions, send dismounted infantry to conduct sweeps. Sweeps are conducted in a methodical manner and in a skirmish line pattern. The keys to a successful ground sweep are optimum area coverage and keen, alert soldiers. Looking at METT-T factors, plan the sweeps so searchers can visually cover the most terrain.

Enemy surveillance teams will sometimes build hard-to-detect spider holes. At NTC, one Blue Force battalion commander discovered this fact when at the end of the mission, to his dismay, an OPFOR surveillance team emerged from the ground not 20 feet from his vehicle. The commander, who watched the entire battle from the hill, was under constant surveillance and didn't know it.

To reiterate, as S2, you must act as the central control so the sweeps are effective. Without such

control, operations are uncoordinated and fruitless.

Chance encounters. Surprisingly, chance encounters often uncover enemy surveillance teams. Friendly EW assets establishing their sites are prime candidates for chance encounters, as are company-level observers or leaders conducting reconnaissance. To take full advantage of these encounters, train your soldiers to look out for enemy surveillance operations. For instance, EW soldiers should conduct a security check of their area when setting up their equipment, since surveillance teams and EW teams often choose the same operating ground. By being watchful and staying alert, and by having an increased awareness of chance encounters, soldiers increase the odds of spotting an enemy surveillance team.

Other intelligence methods. Enemy prisoners of war and captured documents can provide information on enemy surveillance operations. So can analytical deduction. By monitoring and recording his radio traffic, you may locate the enemy, using the content of the reports, triangulation, the process of elimination, or a lapse in enemy COMSEC. Often, you can, at least, narrow a sweep area.

Countermeasures

Once countersurveillance identifies an enemy surveillance position, the unit immediately implements countermeasures to either kill the team or decrease its effectiveness. During terrain sweeps, the most obvious technique is to have the detecting asset capture or kill the team members. Once again, helicopters must be extremely cautious.

If an enemy surveillance team knows its position is compromised the team may try to kill a helicopter flying low and slow. During heliborne sweeps, someone on board should be ready to report that they're under fire. A crashed helicopter with no survivors leaves questions about the cause: Was it mechanical, pilot error, or enemy fire? If possible, an S2 must know the cause.

If a position is isolated, the pilot should call for indirect fire, observe and adjust rounds, and watch as the "king of battle" carves another notch in his belt. Coordinate indirect fires with the FSO before starting countersurveillance operations. Ask for dedicated mortars or artillery. Usually, surveillance positions aren't fortified and are extremely vulnerable to artillery.

If dismounted sweeps have difficulty killing a team, they may call for fire rather than risk casualties. Indirect fire is also effective and timely when used on positions EW assets locate. Subsequent radio transmissions (or lack thereof!) could verify the destruction of the team. If artillery assets are available, they can fire countersurveillance preps on locations you templated as likely enemy surveillance positions.

Another countermeasure is using the enemy surveillance team to "help" the deception plan. If the enemy is in a position to report on the deception (unknown to them), allow them to operate until they're no longer useful, and then eliminate them.

Other countermeasures include frequency jamming, imitative communications deception (ICD), and smoke.

NTC Lessons Learned

As the Deputy COR for the NTC's OPFOR regiment, I gained extensive experience planning and conducting countersurveillance operations. I can comment on what the OPFOR does well during countersurveillance and what the Blue Force does poorly to preserve its surveillance operations. I'm unfamiliar with how the Blue Force conducts its countersurveillance, and since the NTC observation team (lessons learned) doesn't compile information about countersurveillance operations, I can only say what I believe to be true in this area.

The failure of the Blue Force screen mission is most evident. OPFOR scouts regularly infiltrate the sector and insert surveillance teams with impunity. Of 90 infiltrations I planned during force-on-force rotations, only 5 were unsuccessful.

The fault is the Blue Force's lack of screen vigilance, poor vehicle positioning, and lack of urgency in preventing these infiltrations. Often OPFOR scouts drive by screen vehicles where the only living things awake are the moths fluttering around a Chemlite. When Blue Force soldiers manage to stay awake, they have difficulty recognizing the enemy. Often, OPFOR scouts drive by without being stopped for a password. These soldiers either don't know what to do, or don't have the nerve to stop a vehicle.

Many times Blue Force soldiers don't chose appropriate locations to defend against infiltrators. The screen will cover avenues of approach and key areas where enemy reconnaissance is likely. However, it will pay little attention to areas that are inappropriate for reconnaissance purposes but can mask and provide cover for a vehicle inserting surveillance teams.

Another Blue Force failure is insufficient use of helicopters for detecting OPFOR teams. Blue Force units are always well equipped with helicopters—averaging 18 this last year (not including attack helicopters). Yet, out of the last 60 surveillance missions I planned, only 3 teams were compromised by heliborne terrain sweeps. In contrast, OPFOR

heliborne sweeps detected eight Blue Force teams in one rotation!

"There are few things more important at the NTC than eliminating enemy surveillance, and the quicker rotational units learn this fact the better off they'll be."

Helicopters are a valuable countersurveillance weapon, and Blue Force brigades should free these assets so battalion S2s can use them. There are few things more important at the NTC than eliminating enemy surveillance, and the quicker rotational units learn this fact the better off they'll be.

The OPFOR is successful at countersurveillance because we take these operations seriously. We invest the time and effort needed to get the job done. During one particular rotation, a Blue Force light infantry battalion's scout platoon successfully infiltrated the entire platoon and formed two- to three-person surveillance teams. However, when our position detection and countermeasures phases ended, the entire Blue Force platoon was reunited at the OPFOR TOC to await observer/controller escort. All teams had been captured or killed in a matter of 8 hours.

The main reason for OPFOR success is the close coordination and synchronization between EW, helicopters, line units, FSO (Commander Rocket Troop Artillery), and the S2 (COR), with all countersurveillance assets controlled by the COR. While the COR is busy conducting the regiment's countersurveillance, defending motorized rifle battalion commanders conduct these missions also, providing a double level of activity. But again, the COR's deputy coordinates all operations during a face to face meeting with the MRB commander. During a recent defensive mission, the heliborne sweeps detected and killed two enemy teams, EW detected two more, and the MRB killed another.

Another significant factor in OPFOR countersurveillance success is that Blue Force surveillance teams use poor operating procedures. Some of these are—

- ☐ Transmitting during heliborne sweeps, thus allowing the helicopters to home in on the team.
- ☐ Vectoring the helicopter in for the kill. I've heard teams reporting to higher echelons, referencing the helicopter's position from their own. We've actually heard reports like "He's within 50 meters," or "He just passed overhead."
- ☐ Attacking OPFOR EW sites. This is a sure giveaway of a team's position. Striking a site in synchronization with an attack makes sense, but purposely making contact with the enemy 24 hours in advance isn't the surveillance team's mission.
- ☐ Choosing poor positions. A heliborne sweep once detected a six-person long-range surveillance team lying down like ducks in a row on an exposed ridge line. The pilot had no difficulty spotting these high speed individuals, and he followed up with probably the easiest gun run he ever made.
- ☐ Operating without authentication. Our EW once used ICD to convince an entire surveillance team network to jump to another frequency. The frequency was passed in the clear and no one challenged the command. Later, we told the teams to leave their positions and proceed to the nearest trail for extraction. Of course, they complied.
- ☐ Neglecting code use. Passing tactical information that's not encoded makes analytical deduction much easier. The teams should have used standard codes to send such messages.
- ☐ Camouflaging poorly. Using green poncho liners and woodland camouflage netting in a desert background just doesn't cut it.
- ☐ Using poor OPSEC during helicopter insertions. Blue Force birds regularly insert teams at dusk in plain view of the OPFOR. False insertions should always accompany the real thing. Also, there's nothing wrong with inserting a team a few kilometers from their position if a closer concealed landing zone can't be found.

Commanders must realize countersurveillance operations are important to victory on the NTC battlefield, as they will be on future battlefields in some distant land. These operations need to be taught, exercised, planned, and executed. If you give away knowledge, you're giving half the battle to the enemy. Don't meet the enemy halfway.

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Delusions of Grandeur:

Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis

By Captain Justin L. C. Eldridge

The term "ethnocentrism" conjures up images ranging from buffoonish English Victorian-era gentlemen to the Ku Klux Klan. Although this article focuses on just one extreme case of ethnocentrism and its effect on intelligence analysis, many societies have allowed ethnocentrism to influence their judgments of others' actions and capabilities.

Ethnocentrism often serves as the basis for hit-and-miss judgments leading intelligence analysts to faulty and sometimes disastrous conclusions. However, ethnocentric bias has rarely been so detrimental to a nation's fate as it was in influencing Wehrmacht intelligence estimates on the fighting qualities of the Red army in World War II.[1]

Ethnocentrism is a belief in the superiority of one's own ethnic group or an overriding concern with race.[2] Racism is but one extreme of ethnocentrism. Ethnic pride alone doesn't necessarily lead to racism. Yet, uncompromising pride can result in convictions that denigrate others who don't share the same ethnicity or values. Racism easily becomes an outgrowth of ethnocentrism.

Roots of Overconfidence

Military forces are shaped, not only by the weapons they carry, but by the social background they come from and the political function they must perform.[3] An army carries with it both the positive and negative aspects of the society it's pledged to defend. A perfect example of this is Nazi Germany's Wehrmacht. The army that so brilliantly crushed the French and British in June of 1940 and, a year later, almost defeated the Soviet army, suffered from an inherent overconfidence that distorted sound evaluations of its enemies. The early victories over the French and Russians reinforced German beliefs in their own invincibility and, paradoxically, contributed to defeat 4 years later at the hands of enemies they believed were inferior.[4]

The roots of the Third Reich's military overconfidence are deep and found fertile ground as early as the 19th Century. The Prussian army between Napoleon Bonaparte's fall and the Franco-Prussian War was relatively small and professional. Its structure reflected the monarchy's fear of its subjects. Meager funding led the government to retain the Landwehr, a militia-like system that gave Prussia a small professional army with a large reserve in case of war.[5] After the Treaty of Frankfurt codified the humiliating French defeat of 1870-1871, European fashion dictated a nation's military strength become "...the chief factor in [the state's] preservation, and the military class, in consequence, the chief element in its society."[6]

A militarized German society became a conspicuous player in world politics. The German Chancellor, Prince Otto Eduard von Bismarck-Schoenhausen, united Germany and pledged himself to ensuring that civilian authority did not encroach on military prerogative.[7] Kaiser Wilhelm II's accession furthered German militarization. World War I resulted, in part, from a military society convinced of its own invincibility. German plans envisioned a short and successful campaign against the French, as in the Franco-Prussian War 40 years earlier.

This time, German military might didn't produce decisive results. Germany's World War I disaster put her at the mercy of the victorious Allied powers, who made sure the new German army, the Reichswehr, was only 100,000 strong: Large enough for defense, but small enough to ensure German political impotence in postwar Europe.

The Allies could not easily bridle a Germany whose borders had been untouched throughout the war. Adolf Hitler manipulated and then rejected the limitations of the Versailles Treaty. The German middle-class, on whom Hitler relied for legitimacy, supported a politically and militarily reborn Third Reich. The Wehrmacht inherited Hitler's aspirations for European hegemony and eastward expansion. So the Reich hierarchy gave the army, more by default than design, the political duty of bullying Germany's enemies and restoring German pride.

Nazi Ideology

Adolf Hitler wasn't the first to believe German cultural and political domination of Europe was ordained. The Germans historically have shown ethnocentric traits. From the writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller to the music of Richard Wagner, a belief in the inevitable ascendancy of a German culture is thematic. Only a political slight-of-hand was needed to convert these beliefs to political hegemony.

Nazism's ethnocentric components were not unique; Hitler just "...translated the sophisticated ideas of aristocratic conservatism into the vulgar language of German lower middle-class culture."[8] His pan-Germanic and anti-Semitic foreign policy found great popular support.

"Ethnocentric bias has no place in intelligence analysis. Adequate analysis demands, at the very least, a clear and open mind, free from racial prejudice."

Racism was the basis of Nazi ideology, and Hitler "...substituted racism for religion, [a] morality...shared with the rest of the bourgeoisie."[9] In 1933, Dr. Walter Gross, the head of Hitler's Reich Bureau for Enlightenment on Population Policy and Racial Welfare substantiated the relationship between race and government policy when he wrote, "...declining birthrate among the fitter inhabitants and unrestrained propagation among the hereditarily unfit..." was unacceptable to a country that "...thinks along biological lines...."[10] Most Nazi beliefs stemmed from centuries-old values and German *volkisch* thought.[11] Hitler and the Nazi Party transformed ethnocentrism and racism into a political creed.

No Place for Bias

Ethnocentric bias has no place in intelligence analysis. Adequate analysis demands, at the very least, a clear and open mind, free from racial prejudice and political dogma.

The intelligence analysis process is similar, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A main difference lies in the time the analyst has to reach conclusions. Generally, the higher the echelon, the more time the analyst has to ponder questions and answers. The shorter the time, the more likely the analyst will revert to hit-or-miss judgments. Therefore, the military intelligence analyst at the operational and tactical levels must be especially wary of ethnocentric judgments that might influence perceptions and distort conclusions.

Flawed Intelligence

Ethnocentric and racist attitudes contributed to Germany's military defeat during the campaign against the Soviet Union. Evidence suggests ethnocentric biases prevented German intelligence officers from making sound judgments about the Red army. Intelligence should have kept German operations personnel accurately informed of enemy capabilities and intentions. Yet, the perception of the Russians as culturally and racially inferior led to routinely underestimating Soviet higher level command capabilities and intentions. Wehrmacht intelligence analysis was thus inherently and fatally flawed.

On the eastern front, the Germans approached intelligence and operational issues with a specific set of biases. Inherent in Nazi racist perceptions were strong, negative attitudes toward Jews, Slavs, and Bolsheviks. The Germans easily believed the Soviets had limited operational and strategic capabilities, and just as quickly overestimated their own potential.[12] They rejected information not fitting their expectations of how the Soviets would fight. Based on these prejudices, the Germans made decisions that hastened their own collapse.[13] Underestimating an enemy's capabilities can, and often does, lead to surprise.

Only too late, did the Nazis realize the Russian high command could adapt operations to the necessities of war. The debasing of non-Aryan cultures led Nazi decision makers to misunderstand the basic Russian national character for war-fighting. Objective study of the Russians would have shown they fanatically and usually successfully defend their homeland.[14]

German biases were apparent in Hitler's attitude toward intelligence. For him, intelligence was a nuisance interfering with his "intuition and will

power."[15] Because the Nazis didn't understand the broader dimensions of intelligence analysis, "...they incorporated too much of their own narrow military views..." into their estimates.[16] Ethnocentric bias is evident in Wehrmacht intelligence reports and estimates. Key German analysts readily believed they were superior to the "subhuman" Russians.[17]

At the top of the analytical pyramid was Colonel Reinhard Gehlen, whose beliefs typify how ethnocentrism permeated intelligence and operational staffs. Gehlen, as head of the Eastern Army Analysis Section (Fremde Heere Ost), produced intelligence estimates for the German army high command (Oberkommando des Herres, or OKH).[18] His overconfidence was obvious as early as 1942 when he wrote, "...the German soldier [is] justified in feeling he is superior to the enemy, and we have seen that where an assault is launched in force, success is guaranteed."[19] "Gehlen's inflexible conviction[s]..." led him to believe victory was possible even as late as mid-1944.[20]

Ethnocentric characteristics burdened other intelligence officers. These officers, usually reservists, had the same social background and education of many people who readily embraced Nazism. In general, they were nonaristocrats with good educations.

The typical intelligence officer was possibly among the most "Nazified" elements of the Wehrmacht. Like intelligence officers, National Socialist officers in the German army were not aristocrats but were junior reservists whom the state fed Nazi racial theories.[21] In general, these officers had better educations than their aristocratic counterparts and carried with them many of Hitler's prejudices.[22]

"Political considerations drove military decisions, leading some commanders and operations officers...to distort the intelligence picture."

Two German divisions provide examples—the Grossdeutschland and the 18th Panzer Divisions. Nearly one third of the junior officers in these units were Nazi party members. Contrary to popular belief, being a Nazi did not improve the chance for promotion or reward in the Wehrmacht.[23] Party membership fulfilled needs other than promotions. Some of these needs were psychological, and they carried racial baggage with them.

Nazi Propaganda

Effective propaganda reinforced German illusions. Internal German military propaganda contained large amounts of Nazi racial ideology. Propaganda extolled Hitler as the "great" leader and portrayed the Jews as the "natural" Aryan enemy. Much racial propaganda effectively took advantage of existing prejudices. The war in the east manifested these beliefs: The Soviets were political and racial enemies of the Nazis. "The troops were told the fighting in the east was no ordinary war, for it was against the Jewish-Bolshevik and Mongol populations of Russia, the *Untermenschen* who threatened their own Reich."[24]

The Nazis fed their soldiers effective yet subtle internal propaganda.[25] They used traditional military terms from World War I and "...filtered them back into the army with some crucial additions such as racial concepts...." They also supplied the command structure with such items as film, radio broadcasts, newspapers, and booklets to improve the soldiers' political education.

Although there's no proof German soldiers believed Nazi racial propaganda, evidence strongly suggests they did.[26] Because of their roles as political officers, the intelligence officers were responsible for transmitting the propaganda to the soldiers, and possibly were especially vulnerable to it themselves.[27]

Racist influences on intelligence officers resulted in flimsy intelligence estimates. German commanders made operational decisions with little regard for accurate intelligence. Political considerations drove military decisions, leading some commanders and operations officers, even as low as division, to distort the intelligence picture. The Germans shaped their intelligence products to fit their immediate political needs, not reality.[28] These needs did not include intelligence reports extolling the fighting qualities of Russian officers or the planning accomplishments of the Soviet General Staff *(Stavka)*.

Nazi intelligence incorrectly stated the Soviet officer lacked initiative and was incapable of independent action. To the Nazi, the Russian officer was not "inquisitive."

In 1943, contrary to Nazi beliefs, the Soviets pressed their commanders to be imaginative, innovative, and flexible in deception operations. Soviet initiative was not an "innate quality" springing from the soul. Instead, initiative was developed through combat studies. For the Soviets, the only

way to learn initiative was to study military history and quantitative analysis. The major difference between the Soviet and Nazi definition of initiative was the Soviet concept was more narrowly defined and structured.[29]

Operation CITADEL

The battle of Kursk (Operation CITADEL), which was the decisive turning point in the war in the east, effectively illustrates how prejudice can produce faulty intelligence.[30] On July 5, 1943, the Germans launched Operation CITADEL on the eastern front to pinch off the Kursk salient extending 50 kilometers into their territory. The Germans prepared for over 4 months for this operation but found their efforts were useless. Instead of destroying the bulk of the Soviet offensive capabilities as expected, the Germans sacrificed their own in the attempt.[31]

"The Germans shaped their intelligence products to fit their immediate political needs, not reality."

The extensive Soviet preparations in the salient acted as a magnet drawing German forces into a costly battle of attrition. On July 5, 1943, the Germans launched their pincer attacks to cut off the bulge at its base. By July 6, the southern pincer penetrated the Soviet first defensive belt successfully but quickly lost momentum. In the north, Soviet resistance halted the German forces after they'd struggled only a few kilometers. On July 12, the Soviet forces defending the southern portion of the salient counterattacked and smashed the deepest German penetration. Between July 12 and 19, the Soviets began a massive counteroffensive with fresh reserves forcing the Germans to withdraw to their preattack start lines.

Operational and tactical reports before and during CITADEL suggest ethnocentric bias corrupted the intelligence picture and contributed to the German failure. German intelligence never recognized the improved performance of the Soviet army.[32] By 1943, the Soviet high command saw the need to place large operational and strategic forces in depth to exploit tactical success, an innovation the Germans did not recognize.

The Eastern army analysis section's pre-CITADEL assessment of Soviet dispositions and intentions was imprecise and discounted a possible Russian counteroffensive.[33] As early as February 21, 1943, Gehlen and General Kurt Zeitzler, Hitler's chief of staff, evaluated possible future Soviet offensive operations. Though Gehlen and Zeitzler envisioned offensive operations in the Kursk-Orel-Kharkov area, when it came time to assess Soviet intentions, Gehlen suggested the best the Soviets could do was launch limited counterattacks.[34]

In Gehlen's and Zeitzler's war gaming, a Soviet offensive in the Kursk area was not seriously considered. Instead, they viewed Soviet operations north of Orel and south of Kharkov as more likely. The German high command and army group south did not consider the wide range of operations available to the Russian commanders, one of which was a major counteroffensive.[35] Instead, their own steadfast belief in Russian inferiority led them to false conclusions resulting in a major defeat.

Reports issued after Operation CITADEL also contained hints of unjustified arrogance reflecting the Nazis' illusion of an unworthy Soviet enemy. An August 15, 1943, intelligence after-action report of the 41st Panzer Corps called the Soviet infantry "inferior" in the offense and criticized Russian tank unit



"The Nazis were victims of their own propaganda and prejudice."

tactical leadership as "inadequate."[36] The report gave little credit to the Russian soldiers or officers. These criticisms were especially ironic, since the 41st spent more time retreating from their "inferior" enemies than advancing.

Most surprising was the confident tone of the 41st Panzer Corps intelligence officer's report. The after-action report stated, "...the enemy picture which had been assumed was confirmed every time, [sic] at no time did it bring major surprises."[37] This confidence was misplaced. The Soviets mauled the 41st's 18th Panzer Division, and the rapid transition to the offensive surprised the German commanders.[38] The 41st Panzer Corps' after-action report admitted none of the problems they encountered and contributed little factual evidence to the record on how the soviets fought and won at Kursk.

Propaganda Victims

The Nazis were victims of their own propaganda and prejudice. Intelligence and operational reports disclosed the requisite negative attitude toward the "inferior" Red army. Reports extolling Stavka's war-fighting capabilities would have found little sympathy. Hitler and the OKH ignored mounting evidence testifying to the Red army's improvements. Even Gehlen, who had little admiration for Hitler, never recognized that the Soviet army the Germans bested in 1941 wasn't the same one they faced in 1943.

Conclusions

At the battle of Kursk, a common thread of underestimation and derision ran through the intelligence and after-action reports. This underestimation was, to a significant degree, the result of inherent prejudices the German propaganda apparatus encouraged. Few intelligence officers escaped the consequences of their biases.

Racism, one abhorrent aspect of ethnocentrism, does not have to be present to color intelligence reports. Analysts must be cognizant of their biases and compensate as best they can. German analysts could not adjust their Soviet estimates because of either an unwillingness or inability to admit to bigotry, a hallmark of the Nazi regime.

"Ethnocentrism, so ingrained in the German psyche, perverted its intelligence estimates and contributed to the disaster on the Eastern Front."

From 1943, the German military suffered defeats few armies could have endured, especially at the hands of an enemy they considered inherently

second rate. Reality, politics, and ethnocentric images of the Soviet soldier were difficult for German intelligence to separate. Racial propaganda influenced German intelligence decisions, especially since the intelligence staff had primary responsibility for internal propaganda until 2 months before CITADEL. The results of this mutually supporting system of inherent ethnocentrism, propaganda, and politics were intelligence reports filled with faulty analysis, like those of the 41st Panzer Corps.

A society enamored with its own superiority forged Hitler's army. Hitler bestowed on this army the political task of adding "living space" for a growing population and destroying the natural enemies of a resurgent Germany. Early victories reinforced German conceptions of invincibility. Yet wars are not won by bravado or cultural arrogance. Ethnocentrism, so ingrained in the German psyche, perverted its intelligence estimates and contributed to the disaster on the Eastern Front.

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THE FIRST STEPS:
Battalion S2s in World War I

By Captain Michael E. Bigelow

During World War I, the American Army created a modern intelligence system. In Washington, then Major Ralph Van Deman created and headed an extensive national intelligence agency. In France, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) established an intelligence organization on operational and tactical levels. The AEF system's foundation was the battalion S2.

The steps these S2s took in 1917 and 1918 were the first steps on the path we now tread. In the crucible of battle, these S2s proved the need for a systematic approach to intelligence, even at the lowest levels. The foundation for this approach was a cycle of collection, evaluation, and dissemination. Both officers and NCOs executed this system; for the first time, NCOs played a large role in intelligence. Driving all this was **the need to know the enemy**. Besides underscoring the importance of an intelligence system driven by the need to know the enemy, a study of these S2s reminds us of the folly of waiting until the war has started before conducting training.

Creating a System

The American Army entered World War I ill-prepared. It required expansion, equipment, training, and a modern staff structure, including an intelligence structure, for its field units. AEF Commander General John J. Pershing had to attack these problems virtually from scratch. To hone a modern staff, he had his officers study French and British staff systems. By July 1917, he had organized his staff like the four French bureaus: Personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply. But, instead of bureaus, the AEF's staff had four sections—G1, G2, G3, and G4—with responsibilities corresponding to the French bureaus. By the end of 1917, all units from corps to battalion had adopted this structure. Thus the "twos" had intelligence duties at all levels.

While the AEF's staff organization had French roots, its intelligence system had British ones. In July and August 1917, then Major (later Brigadier General) Dennis E. Nolan, the AEF's G2, studied both French and British intelligence theories and procedures. While he found both were effective, Nolan modeled his organization and operations on the British system, which stressed HUMINT and enemy order of battle development. His system was in place by December 1917.

The AEF's intelligence system had two underlying principles: Independence and interdependence. From battalion to army, units had enough resources and personnel to independently produce intelligence along their own fronts. More importantly however, the AEF's system was interdependent. At each level, the intelligence sections collected and studied information on the enemy, used it for their units, and then passed it to higher headquarters. In turn, the higher staffs studied the information, made their conclusions, and furnished **this intelligence** to lower staffs. This exchange of information was critical to both higher and lower intelligence sections. Upward, it gave information on the enemy to higher levels. Downward, it gave lower echelons a broad picture of the enemy situation and helped verify their conclusions.

The battalion S2s were the foundation of this network. The information they passed to higher S2s and G2s was vital to making the whole system work. In fact, Nolan pointed out, "the basis of combat intelligence was the intelligence personnel with the line troops."[1]

The Basis of Combat Intelligence

In World War I, the battalion S2 was more than just a staff section. It consisted of about 30 men organized into 3 groups: A headquarters element, a scout group, and an observer group. Officially, only the S2, a lieutenant, made up the headquarters element. But often he would use the senior sergeant as the section NCOIC and would detail two or three enlisted men to help at the headquarters. The scout group had 3 NCOs and 12 enlisted scouts while the observer group had 2 NCOs and 9 enlisted observers. During operations, the S2 mixed his scouts and observers together. He also often added scouts or observers to patrols and advanced guards from the battalion's line companies.[2]

This organization was by no means uniform in the AEF. Still in its infancy, the American tactical intelligence structure had not reached standardization. As one intelligence officer noted, "The

development of the Battalion Intelligence Section was gradual and due in large measure to the experience, or better, the mistakes of the earlier engagements of the war." Sometimes, battalion commanders had to form their S2 sections without additional resources. In the 1st Division's 18th Infantry, each line company provided 10 men to the S2 section. Heavy losses in battle only complicated the organizational problems.[3]

Reflecting the specialization of war, the battalion S2's duties revolved around the single mission of giving the commander an estimate of enemy plans and intentions. This boiled down to three questions: Who is the enemy, where is he, and what will he do? In answering these questions, the S2 directed the scouts and observers, received reports from patrols, and hastened the transfer of war prisoners and captured documents to the rear. He trained and organized his section, and trained the battalion as a whole on information collection. He also was responsible for obtaining and distributing maps, a job that often proved difficult.

In addition to his intelligence role, the S2 was an integral part of his unit's headquarters. He helped run the command post, and, with the S3, often alternated shifts. When the commander and S3 left the command post to coordinate or inspect, the S2 often acted as commander. In **S2 In Action**, Captain Shipley Thomas, the 26th Infantry's S2, described how he did much of the initial coordination for a regimental attack in July 1918.[4]

Several postwar writers emphasize the qualities a successful intelligence officer needed to fulfill his duties. Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, one of Nolan's officers, wrote that the officer "must have a grasp of the tactics and combat methods of the enemy, his psychology, his organization, and his general intentions, as to be able to arrive at conclusions from the tidbits of news received." Colonel Arthur L. Conger, another of Nolan's staff, stressed an officer needed to be a "thorough master of...tactics." Also, an S2 needed patience, persistence, and thoroughness. Without these traits, he wouldn't be able to piece together a complete and accurate picture of the enemy.[5]

NCOs played a large and important part in the S2 section. As in every war, they were the Army's first-line trainers and small unit leaders. However, in World War I, NCOs moved into the growing field of military specialists. S2 NCOs illustrated both sides of NCO duties: The traditional leader and the modern specialist.

The most important S2 NCO was the senior sergeant, who served as the NCOIC. He recorded and helped collect enemy information, examined captured documents and prisoners, kept the section's records, and did much of the report writing. Moreover, he was the section's second-in-command and often acted as the S2 in the lieutenant's absence. As acting S2, the NCOIC judged the importance of the information received, and transmitted it to those who needed it. As a result, the S2 needed to make sure that his NCOIC could do the job.

The sergeants in charge of the scout and observation groups filled traditional NCO roles. Both needed to make sure their men could do their jobs, and both were mission leaders.[6]

For the most part, the enlisted scouts and observers actually collected the information. They accompanied patrols and manned observation posts. But everyone in the section, including the officers and NCOs, needed to be able to perform one another's duties. During the Meuse-Argonne campaign of September-November 1918, one S2 section was reconstituted more than seven times. In that same campaign, two lieutenants ended up running an observation post which had started the day with one sergeant and four men.[7]

As with organization, the newness of American tactical intelligence hampered S2s in doing their jobs. Since the position didn't even exist until the fall of 1917, a new S2 had little or no idea what his job entailed. Some fortunate officers attended intelligence schools. Others weren't so lucky and had to learn from their own experience.

Initially, those fortunate enough to get training did so at British or French intelligence courses. Later, the AEF formed its own army- and corps-level schools. At the Army Intelligence School, the officers made a detailed study of the German army's organization, tactics, and other subjects that would help them visualize their enemy. They studied topography, aerial photography, and prisoner and captured documents examination.[8]

NCOs and enlisted men trained at regimental or battalion level. NCOs trained their men in map reading, observation, sketching, and reporting. Sometimes, training was thorough and realistic: In the 18th Infantry's intelligence course, the section practiced scoutcraft and conducted patrols under simulated battle conditions.[9]

An Intelligence Cycle

Although the ever-present gap existed between doctrine and practice, an "intelligence cycle" formed the basis for how a World War I S2 section did its job. This cycle consisted of collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information. While no rigid lines divided the functions, they formed a

more or less sequential, yet continuous, process. This process was a clear example of the systematic manner in which AEF S2s tried to operate.

Collection

The cycle's first step was collection. As part of an interdependent system, each intelligence section collected information in an overlapping observation zone. The divisional G2's zone stretched 2 miles beyond enemy lines along the division front, while the regimental S2's zone ranged to a depth of 1 mile. The battalion S2 looked about one-half mile beyond the enemy front.[10]

The battalion S2 had several collection sources, the primary of which were organic to his battalion. He used troops in contact with the enemy as well as his own scouts and observers. To a lesser degree, he got information through the regimental S2.

The battalion S2 used his organic assets in three ways: Patrols, raids, and observation. **Infantry in Battle**, the classic tactical study, states the patrol was the "only one sure means by which [a commander] may secure timely and vital information." Doctrinally, the S2 would attach one or two scouts to each patrol. These scouts would fight only when necessary; their main mission was to gather information. But in reality, the S2's assets were limited and he often had to rely on line troops for information. But with or without scouts, the patrol was the best, and sometimes the only, way to get timely answers during battle.[11]

Raids often provided valuable information on the enemy, although to a lesser degree than patrols. Like patrols, S2 scouts doctrinally accompanied all raids. Again, in practice, they may or may not have gone with the raiding party. If not, the S2 placed himself or one of his NCOs close to the party's release point to get any information it might have. The S2 usually preplanned a raid so the battalion could quickly react to a request from higher headquarters.[12]

With World War I's stabilized nature, observation posts (OPs) played an important role in gathering information on the enemy. Usually one or two OPs could cover the battalion's area. If properly placed, they allowed continuous observation of enemy positions. With the observers carefully watching and reporting, the S2 could determine patterns in enemy activity and make deductions from changes in the norms.[13]

As part of an interdependent system, the S2 could get information from other units. The regimental S2 provided data from its own assets and also linked the battalion S2 to divisional and corps sources. The most important sources were prisoners and captured documents, aerial reconnaissance, and radio intelligence. The S2s especially valued aerial photography. Still, the battalion's enemy information largely came from patrols, raids, and observation posts.

To direct his collection assets, the S2 produced an intelligence plan. Based on the battalion's needs and higher headquarters' requirements, the intelligence plan took the form of a field order. In it, the S2 established what information to collect, who would collect it, and how to report it. Usually, the S2 issued the plan when the operation began, and would change it as the situation changed.[14]

Evaluation

After collecting information, the S2 evaluated it. In a three-part evaluation, he converted the accumulated information into intelligence. First, he determined its accuracy. Second, he used his information to piece together the enemy situation. Last, he tried to ascertain enemy intentions. To do this

properly, the S2 needed to look at the situation from the enemy's point of view.

Ideally, the S2 based his evaluation on knowledge of the enemy, tactical logic, and common sense. As one intelligence officer noted, "Guesses and hunches have no place in the Intelligence Service." Instead, the S2 should support his analysis with collected information. In practice, however, the situation wasn't so ideal. Inevitably, guesswork played some role in the S2's estimates.[15]

Dissemination

The S2's last function was to disseminate the estimates. This was as important as collection and evaluation. For no matter how accurate the S2's intelligence, if it wasn't in the hands of those who needed it, it was useless. While AEF intelligence officers never discounted downward or lateral flow of information, they emphasized the importance of upward distribution.

The AEF's intelligence network depended on information from the battalions and regiments. As Captain Thomas wrote, intelligence "is a mosaic of the bits of information gathered by local S2s." Using the same analogy, Lieutenant Colonel Sweeney noted "the mosaic...of the enemy might be made complete by information which [was] unimportant to a division or lower commander." As a result, it was vital that the battalion S2 passed information to regimental and higher headquarters.[16]

Although the emphasis was on upward flow, distribution within the battalion was critically important. In his final report, General Nolan noted that S2s sent intelligence higher only after they gave it to their commanders. Battalion S2s also gave intelligence to the battalion staff, artillery liaison, and subordinate companies.[17]

The S2 used oral, written, and graphic dissemination means. Normally, he orally briefed the intelligence to the commander and staff, both before and during the battle. For higher headquarters, the S2 wrote a daily intelligence report, supplemented by sketches and diagrams to graphically portray the enemy situation. These situation maps were the main intelligence source for the battalion's subordinate and supporting units. The S2 also maintained his own situation map which he kept updated.[18]

On the Defense

When his battalion was in defensive positions, the S2 had a relatively easy task in collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information. Often the process started even before the battalion took its position. The outgoing S2 briefed the incoming S2 on the enemy situation and provided maps, photographs, and recent intelligence reports. After some study, the incoming S2 drew his own situation map, and then briefed the commander and staff.

Once the battalion was in position, the process was routine. With carefully prepared positions and wire communications, the OPs were the S2's most important collection assets in the defense. Patrols and raids augmented the OPs. Also, as mentioned, the S2 could obtain aerial photographs of enemy positions. Evaluation and dissemination were relatively easy because neither the enemy nor the battalion situation changed much from day to day.[19]

On the Offense

In contrast, when the battalion was on the offense, the S2's job was difficult. Once the attack started, timelines shortened. And after the initial phase, the S2 couldn't make detailed preparations. Instead, he depended on reconnaissance in battle.

During an attack, the S2 had to rely almost solely on his scouts and observers for collection. He sent scouts with the advance guard, while others followed behind to search for documents and equipment. Using a "leap-frog" system, OPs accompanied lead and flank elements. They would report to the S2 by runners or prearranged signals. Often the S2 roamed through the sector to help collect information.

With the rapidly changing situation, evaluation and dissemination became more difficult. The flood of information made it harder to evaluate a rapidly changing enemy situation. This made more dissemination necessary, but it also made contacting recipients harder.[20]

The S2 depended heavily on his NCOs during an attack. At the command post, the NCOIC played a large role. He recorded and reported the information, and often, acted as the S2. Scout and observer NCOs had to use their own judgment and initiative to accomplish the mission. The section had to have teamwork to succeed during an attack.

Assessments

The AEF's battalion S2s were hardly perfect; at best, their performance was uneven. S2s often planned patrols poorly and made incorrect estimates. Commanders went uninformed of the enemy situation. Yet these very imperfections indicate an important lesson: The need for realistic training in peacetime.

Like much of the AEF, MI suffered from a lack of prehostility training. Even so, because neither the

S2s nor an intelligence doctrine existed before the war, it would have been impossible to conduct realistic training in peacetime. Although the Army made an impressive effort at training once the war began, it came too late. S2s and their NCOs often were trained hastily or not at all, resulting in unimaginative tactics and inadequate intelligence. Then, like now, they should have trained as they would fight, and they should have done this before, not during, combat.

In spite of training shortcomings, these S2s established three important trends. First, they generally approached intelligence production systematically. The AEF laid out organizations, defined roles, developed techniques, and outlined procedures for S2s. More importantly, it articulated a cycle of collection, evaluation, and dissemination. This cycle is relatively unchanged today, suggesting its timelessness. Technology and techniques have changed tremendously since 1918, but the intelligence cycle has transcended the changes and stood the test of time and the forge of war.

Second, knowing the enemy was the S2 system's foundation. The AEF attempted to train its S2s on German organization, tactics, and doctrine. Unfortunately, it was only partially successful, and many S2s had to learn about the enemy on their own. But no matter how it was learned, S2s needed to know the enemy to make the system work properly. Moreover, this knowledge needed to go beyond simply recounting order of battle. Successful S2s were able to envision enemy operations to predict their intentions.

Last, NCOs played a vital role in their S2 sections. The NCOs were both specialists and first-line leaders and trainers. NCOs made sure S2 scouts and observers collected information by training and then leading them. An NCO aided intelligence distribution by performing necessary administrative tasks. Moreover, an NCO often acted as the S2 in the S2's absence. Without NCOs, the S2 simply couldn't function.

Even without an American precedent, the AEF's battalion S2s accomplished much. By simply establishing the S2s at the battalion level, the AEF made a notable improvement in combat intelligence. Moreover, the AEF developed the basic concepts and organizations of an S2 system. The Army would improve and refine this system over time, through World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Nevertheless, the system developed in 1917-1918 remains the foundation for our battalion S2s today.

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Captain Michael E. Bigelow is the military history instructor at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. He served as a tank battalion S2, assistant brigade S2, and the chief of the All-Source Production Section in the 1st ID (M) at Fort Riley, Kansas. He is a graduate of Colorado State University and has a master's degree in history from Temple University. Bigelow is a regular contributor to **MIPB**.

The New Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course

By Colonel Robert B. Mangold

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, and Chief of the Military Intelligence Corps said it best: "You will graduate from this new MIOAC as the best trained and most capable Military Intelligence officers this institution has ever produced. It isn't going to be easy—on your part, or ours. We are going to push you to the limit and, in some cases, beyond. But we have no choice. What we do for our commanders and soldiers on the battlefield is vital at every echelon. You cannot fail."

MIOAC for the Nineties

With these words, on October 3, 1991, we implemented a new MIOAC training strategy. The new MIOAC remains a 20-week course entailing a PCS move to Fort Huachuca. All officers, including those designated for 35B training (Post Graduate Intelligence Program [PGIP]), attend the full 20 weeks. The course's focus is all-source intelligence and it's designed around a building block approach. Below is a list of the modules and the hours of instruction devoted to each.

Modules (In Order Taught)	Hours
Company Command	111
Global Threat	27
Threat Tactics	40
Organization, Equipment, and Operations (OREO)	150
Intelligence Cycle (Battalion/ Brigade)	166
Intelligence Cycle (Division, Corps, EAC)	139
Intelligence Cycle (LIC)	78
Total Hours	**711**

During the curriculum's field coordination, we reached a consensus that three types of assignments require assignment specific training (AST): Counterintelligence (CI), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).

The Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application Training Program course at Goodfellow AFB will serve as the AST for imagery. Here at the Intelligence Center, we will give 5-week AST courses in CI and SIGINT. We project we'll need to provide AST for about 50 CI and 100 SIGINT officers a year. (Less than 29 percent of all assignments require AST.) Officers who require AST will either attend directly after the 20-week MIOAC or return TDY at a later date en route to their assignments.

Our efforts, culminating in this new training strategy, have been underway for over a year. Under the leadership of Colonel John H. Black (Director of the Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science), we formed a task force of training developers and trainers to evaluate our training needs. Observations and input from the field as well as recommendations of recent course graduates largely determined our training strategy.

During a September 1990 session with the commandant, we reviewed the MIOAC as it was then configured. Figure 1 shows this configuration. The commandant supported our analysis that the old MIOAC—

- ☐ Failed to prepare officers for company command.
- ☐ Contained too much review and repetition of subjects covered in the MIOBC and MI Officer Transition Course.
- ☐ Did not train officers at the advanced all-source intelligence level.
- ☐ Created specialists rather than leaders and managers.
- ☐ Failed to properly teach—
  - o The pivotal role of collection management and how to do it.
  - o Predictive analysis and synthesis.
  - o Exploitation management and the IEW synchronization plan.
  - o MI as a functioning whole (system of systems).

Not surprisingly, we wrote a problem statement, from which we developed a Mission Essential Task List (METL):

- ☐ Train company commanders.
- ☐ Train battalion and brigade S2s.
- ☐ Train all-source intelligence officers.

We then used the METL to form our MIOAC training strategy.



Figure 1. MIOAC Fort Huachuca.

Company Command Module

Perhaps the most requested course improvement was a dedicated instruction module covering the knowledge and skills required for command. Figure 2 lists the Company Command Module's blocks. Its emphasis is to provide answers to the question, "I've been selected for company command; what do I do now?" In the Company Command Module we focus on specifics:

- ☐ Examining change of command inventory procedures.
- ☐ Operating a company level awards and decorations program.
- ☐ Administering an Article 15.
- ☐ Planning and executing unit training programs.
- ☐ Running a company NBC room.
- ☐ Managing a company motor pool.
- ☐ Planning a company deployment, to include preparation for overseas movement.

An important Company Command Module component is Leadership Training. Leadership I introduces the subject and discusses the vital role the study of military history plays in leadership. It contains a seminar, led by a colonel or lieutenant colonel, on how to "take charge," to include requisite planning on who to see and policies to implement.

Leadership 2 focuses on the NCO. It also contains a seminar conducted by successful first sergeants. Leadership 3, led by successful company commanders, deals with developing family support plans and groups. It discusses company commander and spouse roles, and how to deal with inevitable family emergencies.

The capstone piece of the Company Command Module is the Military Leadership Seminar, which is an 8-hour Saturday session led by an MI colonel. It focuses on contemporary leadership issues the students research and present as a way to stimu-



Figure 2. MI Company Command module.

Computer Graphics: Kazuko Klever

late discussion. The leadership instruction is a superb example of the building block approach used throughout the entire course and the application of small group instructional techniques.

Global Threat Module

The 27-hour Global Threat Module focuses on the six DOD recognized regional threats. It begins with an explanation of how to prepare a threat assessment and examines Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The class is divided into six work groups. Each group, on off-duty time, develops a regional threat assessment. The group then briefs the threat to a senior staff or faculty member.

Threat Tactics Module

The 40-hour Threat Tactics Module is conference oriented and deals with the tactical doctrines of the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Western European countries. The module covers offensive and defensive operations, communications, radio electronic combat operations, and low-intensity conflict including terrorist group ideologies, operations, and organizations.

NSA Subcourses

Before beginning the IEW OREO Module, students must complete (on their own time) two NSA subcourses. The first subcourse, Introduction to Signals Technology (EA-009), is a take-home practical exercise (PE) dealing with basic signal theory and communications systems. It requires 20 hours of work to complete. The second, Operation ELINT, Fusion Analysis, and Reporting (IS-070), is an 18-hour PE introducing ELINT and RADAR principles, procedures, and operations. It is compartmented and students must do it off-duty in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. Both subcourses are important because they provide the fundamentals upon which all SIGINT is based.

IEW OREO Module

The OREO Module is 150 hours covering IEW organization, equipment, and operations. Figure 3



Figure 3. IEW OREO.

shows the blocks taught in OREO. We expanded blocks we taught previously, to include all the intelligence disciplines at all echelons. For example, the 14-hour SIGINT Operations block focuses on tactical and strategic voice operations, remote systems and operations, and ELINT reference manuals. The CI Activities block delves into the four CI functions at all echelons: Investigations, operations, collection/analysis, and interrogation operations. The objective is obvious: Establish a baseline knowledge of all intelligence disciplines at all echelons.

Intelligence Cycle Module

The Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Cycle and the Division, Corps, and EAC Intelligence Cycle Modules are similar in objective and method of instruction. Our focus is to train the command estimate process through PEs. Figure 4 shows the Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Cycle Module. Including the examination, 87 percent of the module is hands-on practical application of what students and instructors discuss in seminars. For example, in the 47-hour command estimate offense classes, students—

- ☐ Conduct battalion/brigade level IPB and mission analysis.
- ☐ Prepare an intelligence estimate.
- ☐ Exercise wargaming skills.
- ☐ Prepare plans, orders, and graphics.
- ☐ Present numerous decision briefs (in many cases to senior officers).

During the Division, Corps, and EAC Intelligence Cycle Module, we devote 27 hours to a "Fighting the MI Battalion and Company" PE and 64 hours to an "All-Source Intelligence" PE. These deal with collection management and the IEW synchronization matrix, all-source production, and exploitation of all-source assets at ECB through EAC. The capstone exercise for these modules is the G2 Workstation, an automated division level exercise with a Korean scenario.

The course concludes with a 78-hour module on the Intelligence Cycle—Low Intensity. Over 50 percent of this module is PE, which requires applica-


AIRLAND OPS DIRECTED RESEARCH
COMMAND ESTIMATE INITIAL EXAM
COMMAND ESTIMATE OFFENSE EXERCISE
COMMAND ESTIMATE DEFENSE EXERCISE
COMMAND ESTIMATE FINAL EXAM
INTEL CYCLE DIRECTED RESEARCH
INTEL CYCLE INITIAL EXAM
INTEL CYCLE APPLICATION EXERCISE
INTEL CYCLE FINAL EXAM
AUTOMATION SUPPORT TO PROCESSING AND IMAGERY PROCESSING

Figure 4. Battalion and brigade intelligence cycle.



Figure 5. 35C, 35E, and 35G cross training.

tion of collection management, processing, and IPB using a LIC scenario.

Conclusion

The new MIOAC satisfies the METL approved by the commandant. The course trains company commanders, battalion/brigade S2s, and all-source intelligence officers. Any doubters should look at Figure 5, which shows cross training by discipline in the old MIOAC versus our new MIOAC.

Our training strategy was briefed to and approved by general officers and senior civilians at TRADOC, INSCOM, NSA, and the ODCSINT of the Army. As mentioned earlier and in response to requirements for some specialized training, we have created two AST courses in the CI and SIGINT areas. These courses are tentatively scheduled to start this spring. As with our new MIOAC, they will be PE oriented. I'll cover more about these courses in a subsequent issue of **MIPB**.

Our new MIOAC should not be feared, but respected. Success is designed into the course. However, achieving these ends requires a commitment from each student and faculty member in terms of time and work effort. Together we can do it, and together we will do it—because we cannot fail on the battlefield.

Colonel Robert B. Mangold received his commission through ROTC from Youngstown State University. He has attended the MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. He has an MA from Wayne State University. Colonel Mangold has been assigned as Deputy Commander, 501st MI Brigade, Korea; Commander, 14th MI Battalion, Fort Lewis, WA; Assistant to the Chief, MI Corps, and Deputy Chief of Staff, USAIC, Fort Huachuca. He currently is assigned as the Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAIC, Fort Huachuca.

PROPONENT NOTES

YOUR CAREER...*What's Happening!*

By Colonel Lanning M. Porter, Major Robert A. Smith, and Captain Kelly A. Crosby

For the next few years, **change** is the name of the game for MI. You are all aware that revolutionary political, economic, social, and military changes are occurring in virtually every nation on the globe—to include the United States. New threats and new alliances are emerging. World leaders are grappling to redefine regional and national interests. Resources dedicated to military forces are declining. Technology is advancing rapidly.

As a result, MI leaders must now reexamine, rethink, and, where necessary, adjust MI organizations, systems, doctrine, and training. This article will acquaint you with some of the significant adjustments we envision in MI over the next several years and the impact they may have on your career and career choices.

First, the Army is getting smaller. As of this writing, we anticipate an active force reduction to about 520,000 personnel in the next 5 years, with even more cuts after that. Presently, we project an MI reduction from about 41,000 to 31,000 officers, enlisted, and civilians by 1995. To get started in that direction, the Army has initiated a Voluntary Early Retirement and Release Program for those who wish to leave the Army early. In addition, we believe some MI personnel will be affected by RIF or Selective Early Retirement Board actions.

While this can be traumatic, the overall impact may not be as bad as we might think. The worst case scenario would call for a 25 percent reduction in MI. This means we would retain 75 percent of the people in MI. Those with below center of mass files and below average performance ratings have cause to worry. Those with average and above average records simply need to ensure their files remain competitive. More about that later.

Second, in the next 10 years we will replace virtually every major piece of equipment MI uses with new, technologically advanced, automated systems. Our enlisted soldiers will feel the greatest impact of this modernization because of the dramatic changes in the skills required for their MOSs. All MI professionals will need to understand these new systems and how they work together to improve the intelligence product we provide.

Third, these force reductions and new systems will have a profound impact on MI organizational structure. Between now and 1997, we will restructure virtually every MI unit from platoon to EAC. The number of commands will shrink and command opportunities will decrease. For example, compare the percentages of command opportunities that exist now and those projected for the future: Captains,

53 percent now to 38 percent in the future; majors, 27 to 25; lieutenant colonels, 45 to 25; and colonels, 44 to 19.

The Army will adjust officer structure and NCO/enlisted grade standards, create new MOSs, and consolidate others. We'll have to update every authorization document and adjust life cycle models for all grades.

Fourth, these changes, plus the lessons we learned from Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM, will result in new doctrine for fighting on land, on sea, in the air, and, eventually, in space. We're currently forming a task force to rewrite FM 100-5, **Operations**, to reflect new Army doctrine. These changes will cause us to reconsider how we perform the intelligence function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. We'll soon begin to rewrite the FM-34 series together with other doctrinal manuals. Many of you will have a part in this effort.

Fifth, we'll continue to revamp and modernize our training system throughout the nineties. We'll begin by moving our Fort Devens colleagues to Fort Huachuca. Then, we'll rewrite most of the courses taught at the new Intelligence Center. We've already begun with the new MIOAC. Work is ongoing to improve MI instruction at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). And we need a mid-level MI course for majors and lieutenant colonels to update them on emerging MI systems and doctrine; and a similar course for warrant officers. We're also planning new courses for NCOs and enlisted soldiers.

Additionally, we must explore various educational opportunities offered by the Defense Intelligence College. We must make sure our best and most experienced officers and NCOs have an opportunity to pass their knowledge on to those who follow. Toward this end, we're already placing greater emphasis on duty at the Intelligence Center.

Leader development will continue to depend on the three pillars: Institutional training, operational assignments, and self development. Future MI leaders must be accomplished strategists, operational artists, tacticians, thinkers, leaders, managers, technicians, teachers, and mentors. They must know their MI business thoroughly, and be completely familiar with all the "INTS"—such as HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT.

They must understand our intelligence systems and how they all fit together—the system of systems. They must be versed in world events—politics, economics, sociology, and military affairs. They must know how the Pentagon works, how the budgeting and procurement process works, and how plans are made and executed. And future MI leaders must know a great deal about the rest of the Army—all arms, Active and Reserve Components. And finally, they must have some joint and combined experience.

In addition, we must have a small cadre of senior MI officers who excel in a given intelligence specialty, and another small group who successfully manage to dual track in MI and a second functional area or AOC such as the Army Acquisition Corps, Aviation, or Foreign Area Officer. These officers make up the amalgam that will lead, manage, teach, and guide junior officers into the future.

To become complete MI officers, junior MI officers must plan careers that include schools and assignments that add to their professional development. The MI Career Future chart shows some of these options. Note that there is no set career pattern for the MI officer. Nor is there a specific set of "mandatory" or "branch qualifying" assignments that every MI officer must have to succeed. As a rule, successful MI officers plan for a variety of troop, command, and staff assignments at tactical, operational, and strategic levels over the course of their careers.

In addition, there are many things you can do to make sure your file is as competitive as possible. The following suggestions are simple, but there are many MI soldiers who either haven't gotten the word or have ignored sound counsel. First, keep your photo up to date. This is especially important for officers detailed to other branches as they return to MI. Second, check and update your ORB. Third, make sure your ORB and OERs reflect your support to the warfighter. This is especially critical for soldiers serving at EAC. Selection boards are made up mostly of combat arms officers and they want to know how your efforts support them. If your OER doesn't show that support, you won't do as well as those whose OERs are written from a warfighting perspective.

As lieutenants, work at troop level, whether you're detailed to another branch or not. Get a good foundation in the tactical army. Get your boots muddy.

As MI captains detailed to other branches, do everything you can to contribute to that other branch. If you're transitioning into MI, attending the MI Officer Transition Course will prepare you for MIOAC and future MI assignments. An MI captain should strive to command a company and to be a battalion S2. If these opportunities escape you, focus on jobs that will enhance your intelligence abilities, such as intelligence staff or analytical positions.

As an MI major you must complete CGSC either in residence or by correspondence before entering the primary zone for selection to lieutenant colonel. You should strive to serve with troops as a battalion executive officer, S3, or brigade S2. Other key positions are division and corps G2 staff and MI brigade staff. Also, many joint duty and DA staff assignments contribute to the Army's mission and support warfighters.

Lieutenant colonels have the opportunity to make significant contributions to the Army. By this time, to be competitive, you should have a solid record of tactical, operational, and strategic MI assignments. You should have a broad knowledge of MI systems and doctrine. If you decide to specialize you will succeed by showing superior performance in that specialty.

Warrant officers should seek assignments that keep you technically and tactically proficient in your MOS and enhance your value as commissioned officers. You NCOs need to excel in as many areas covered on your NCOER as possible. You need to make sure your rater counsels you and that you both agree on what constitutes excellence.

In summary, the next decade will be filled with change and challenge for all MI personnel. We will experience much turbulence and some uncertainty. Nevertheless, we have much to do and excellent people to do it with. Competition will be stiff, but the rewards will be there for those who do well.

Colonel Lanning M. Porter is the Assistant to the Chief, MI; Major Robert A. Smith is the Force Structure Officer; and Captain Kelly A. Crosby is the Professional Development Officer. Their phone numbers are DSN 821-1174 and 821-1181 and commercial (602) 533-1174 and 533-1181; mailing address is ATTN: ATSI-MI, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.



Computer Graphic:
Gary Briles

By Colonel Joseph T. Mesch and Lieutenant Colonel David Miner

With this issue, we welcome Lieutenant Colonel Dave Miner, our newly assigned Guard soldier. All three components—Active, Guard, and Reserve—must work together throughout the MI community; and, with his arrival, we at Fort Huachuca are setting the example to enhance professionalism for all MI soldiers.

Conference Update

The annual Army National Guard MI Conference held in October was a huge success. Some 200 soldiers attended and, for the second year, Army Reserve MI units participated—another plus for cooperation.

Brigadier General Sam Gray, the FORSCOM J2, was the keynote speaker. After reviewing the nation's counterdrug efforts, he called for a united effort between FORSCOM and state law enforcement agencies on this issue. Claiming we can win the drug fight, Brigadier General Gray stressed the importance of the Reserve Component intelligence effort, especially in production and analysis.

Gray's deputy, Colonel W. A. Sweet, then briefed FORSCOM's Action Plan to man, equip, and train RC divisional MI battalions. Colonel Sweet pointed out that we have the equipment and the ability to train at Regional Training Sites-Intelligence. But the kicker continues to be low MOS-qualified personnel in the divisional battalions—most of these soldiers are only about 50 percent MOS-qualified. However, this should improve with intensive management of the MI Special Training Element (MISTE). For those who may not know, MISTE assigns cleared and experienced soldiers leaving active duty to MI Reserve troop units, regardless of location. The newly established Army Reserve Command is the focal point for MISTE management.

Major General Ken Himsel, FORSCOM Guard Deputy CG for Training, also spoke. He cited the need for RC leaders to recognize intelligence as an important battlefield operating system. Training programs must highlight a seamless web of intelligence from national systems to the battalion soldier.

The MI Conference included unit workshops for divisional battalions to linguistic battalions to state intelligence offices. All agreed these produced solid results. Kudos to Colonel Dale Decker who coordinated this huge effort. Next year's session will be in Nashville, Tennessee.

ITAAS

The Reserve Intelligence School Workshop, jointly sponsored by the FORSCOM J2 and the MI Center, was another cooperative effort. We invited all five Reserve school commandants and staffs to the Proponent to update them on MI Total Force issues such as MI Relook and to work on FY 92 training year calendars.

There were some firsts at this workshop. For instance, all five commandants and staffs came back to the Proponent and the National Guard Bureau participated. Also, the Proponent sponsored a course manager update for course managers from ITAAS/Regional Training Sites-Intelligence in December as a result of the workshop.

A former ITAAS commander and a long time supporter of the MI Total Force, Retired Colonel Bill Bridges, also participated.

The ITAASs are in the process of transitioning to U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools-Intelligence. The First U.S. Army led the way when it officially came under the new designation in October. The other four schools will complete the changeover during FY 92. This transition will result in specialized (Intelligence) Reserve Forces Schools which will provide year-round MI training for RC soldiers in each region.

Advisory Committee Conference

The Advisory Committee Conference will be held early this year. The date depends on when the MI G2/Commanders Conference is scheduled, since we plan to schedule both these conferences back to back to save time and travel. As soon as a firm date for the G2/Commanders Conference is set, we'll set a date for the Advisory Committee Conference.

Terminator versus Couch Potatoes

If you're planning to attend training at a Reserve Forces School and you're out of shape, forget it. TRADOC insists you first pass the physical fitness test. When you send for your diploma, enclose your test scorecard (DA Form 705) verifying you've successfully completed the APFT within the last 8 months. Do not embarrass yourself or your unit—stay in shape.

The Incredible Shrinking Army

With the redefined threat, the Active Army is shrinking by about 25 percent. The Reserve Component end strength will probably stay about the same. Congress wants to ensure a place for good soldiers who are no longer needed on the first team. Total Force Intelligence has a superb opportunity to acquire experienced, quality transitioning soldiers. Clearly, not all soldiers leaving active duty can or should fill a Selected Reserve MI slot. But quality soldiers are welcome to serve in MI slots with troop units and individual mobility augmentation.

Remember, if you can't find one of these Selected Reserve slots, don't give up on being a citizen-soldier. You can stay active as an Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldier. Serving as an IRR buys time and allows you to transition to a troop slot in the future.

Warrant RC Opportunities

More than 50 percent of RC MI warrant slots are vacant. This is a magnificent RC entry point for good, experienced sergeants leaving the AC. The Proponent's Chief Warrant Officer Four Edward Molina ensures applicants' credentials meet experience and quality standards. We at the MI Proponent are working on a program to recruit qualified soldiers who will be leaving active duty. These soldiers will complete the warrant training program while still on active duty. Upon ETS, soldiers will be sworn in as warrants in specific RC slots in MI troop units. This effort has enormous potential, and is a logical way to relieve the warrant shortage and to help good soldiers.

Don't forget, eligible RC soldiers may also apply. RC training time is 4 weeks at Fort McCoy and 6 weeks (4 weeks-common and 2 weeks specific) at Fort Huachuca.

Clearances

Soldiers attending the 96D Imagery Analyst course now need a Top Secret/Special Intelligence (SI) clearance by a Special Background Investigation. Other MOSs which require SI access are the 33, 97, and 98 series. Under DA quidelines, all initial entry training soldiers (AC and RC) are treated the same in security processing. Clearances should not be a stopper for RC soldiers needing training at the Intelligence Center.

Colonel Joe Mesch and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Miner are the Reserve Forces advisors for the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. You may reach them at DSN 821-1176, commercial (602) 533-1176, or by mail, ATTN: ATSI-RA.

CAREER NOTES

Officer Notes

By Lieutenant Colonel William T. Torpey

The DA Form 67-8, Officer Evaluation Report, celebrated its 12th anniversary in September 1991. While inflation has influenced this document, the 67-8 has clearly proven to be a reputable assessment tool and has not only outlived but out-performed all of its predecessors. Part of its success is due to the communication process designed to take place among the rated officer, the rater, and the senior rater. Our evaluation system is at its best when officers communicate. The support form, DA Form 67-8-1, is the prescribed vehicle for counseling.

Since my arrival at MI Branch, I have had the opportunity to review hundreds of OERs and speak to an alarming number of officers who were surprised by their senior rater's block check or narrative. This disconcerting dilemma occurs in two categories. The first is when an officer leaves the organization without an OER counseling by the rating chain. Then, several months later, he gets a less than desirable OER in the mail. At this point, unless he can appeal the OER, the damage is done. We now have a disillusioned and often irate officer in the early stage of a new tour. Maintaining enthusiasm and inspiring subordinates are difficult when one is professionally wounded.

In the second scenario, the officer is, in fact, counseled. The senior rater tells him he's running with or ahead of the pack. Several months later when he receives his updated fiche he finds his one block is actually center of mass, or his two block is below center of mass based on the senior rater's profile. Unfortunately, this happens when a senior rater lacks the courage to be honest with an officer or has lost sight of his profile. Neither case is acceptable when one weighs the impact on the rated officer's career. Senior raters must carefully manage their profiles. And PERSCOM will help them if needed. However, integrity and honesty must drive the process.

Every rater should counsel his officers at OER time. Normally, the rater does this through his Potential block. Although AR 623-105 doesn't **require** a senior rater to counsel a rated officer, the accepted practice among true professionals is for the senior rater to counsel the officer and to provide him a completed copy of the OER before he leaves the command. This process precludes surprises, which are inconsistent with our professional values.

Each officer in the rating scheme must make sure the OER system works properly. Communication is the key. I'm speaking not only as the Branch Chief but also as a victim. Don't allow surprises to occur!

Enlisted Notes

By Lieutenant Colonel William S. Skinner, Jr.

Recent force alignment reviews show we're still short of sergeants in MOSs 96B, 96D, 97B, and 97G. Commanders should aggressively pursue promotions for their soldiers by sending them to promotion boards and PLDC in a timely manner.

We're seeking volunteers for MOS 97B. Volunteers can get language training in Korean, Arabic, German, Persian-Farsi, and Russian. If you're interested, send a DA Form 4187 verifying your DLAB test. IAW AR 611-6, you must apply 8 to 10 months before DEROS or after 12 to 18 months on station in CONUS. Include up to three language choices and state your willingness to train in an alternate language if preferred choices are filled. MOS 98G soldiers with German, Czech, or Polish language skills may apply immediately for 97B, IAW DA Pam 650-8, procedure 3-33.

Training for MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator, begins in 1993. However, soldiers shouldn't request reclassification for 96U until training seats are available in FY 93.

In an ongoing attempt to clarify the 97B transition course, the Branch needs input from all levels. Commands need to identify those soldiers who need transition training and award of a Y2 ASI. In addition, soldiers who transitioned at Fort Huachuca or from a mobile training team need to provide copies of their diplomas and AERs for their CMIF at Branch.

Commanders of 97B's need to comply with AR 614-200, F-10, paragraph C, which requires them to write letters of recommendation for a soldier's retention or nonretention. They must provide letters on all soldiers who have completed 1 year's probation or are 21 years old, whichever is later. Recommendations remain a part of soldiers' files.

The Army needs volunteers for airborne training in MOSs 96B, 96D, 97B, and 97E. Soldiers may train in TDY and return or en route status. Assignment opportunities include Fort Bragg and worldwide Special Operations units. There are reenlistment incentives, as well.

MI Branch Assignment Philosophy

If you've ever wondered how Branch makes your assignments, this article is for you. It gives you the basics of the assignment process and how Branch makes assignments at PERSCOM.

The MI Branch serves a key function in PERSCOM's personnel management system. In the basic assignment process, the Enlisted Distribution Division processes individual personnel replacement requisitions and gives them to Branch in priority order.

At Branch, the appropriate MOS assignment manager and the professional development NCO analyze the requisitions. This team acts together to match soldiers to requirements, while considering DA DCSPER assignment policies, priority of fill information, PERSCOM operation instructions, and Proponent career development philosophy. Using the enlisted master file (EMF) and the soldier's CMIF, they identify the most qualified, eligible soldier for each requisition. The accuracy of the enlisted master file (SIDPERS input) is critical to the process' effectiveness.

Additionally, the team looks at the assignment's impact on the losing and gaining commands. It arranges for training and considers the professional development needs and the personal preference of each recommended soldier. The team may challenge the requisition's validity and cancel it, or, based on unforeseen requirements, request a location other than those listed. PERSCOM then sends the results to the field through the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System. The team also processes personnel actions soldiers submit to

PERSCOM. The assignment manager considers each request individually before responding or recommending.

The team uses the NCOER, fiche, DA Forms 2 and 2-1, and copies of personnel actions from the CMIF. It also has EMF listings, promotion and school selection lists, training quotas, and distribution guidance.

The Branch acts as the Army's single focal point for MOS management, including assignments, career development, policy initiatives, distribution, strength management, force structure change, ASI management, and school seat quotas. Our primary concern is the Army's mission, so the goal is to place properly trained, professionally developed soldiers in the right place at the right time, with due consideration to individual preference.

98K Fast Track Program

PERSCOM sent many skill levels 1 and 2 98K's letters about the Fast Track Program. PERSCOM uses this program to realign MOS and grade overages through reenlistment and reclassification. It's using Fast Track to pare down MOS 98K, Electronic Warfare Non-Morse Interceptor, which lost authorizations because of changing intelligence requirements.

PERSCOM already informed soldiers eligible to participate in Fast Track: Sergeants and below not holding ASIs U1, M7, or K2. Soldiers should respond with their choices quickly due to limited class seats in each specialty. Soldiers within the reenlistment window may reenlist for option F-3 only. Because MOS 98K is in Fast Track, these soldiers may reenlist immediately, even though they may not be in the reenlistment window. AR 601-280 has details about immediate reenlistment qualifications.

Available Fast Track MOS choices are 96B, Intelligence Analyst; 97B, CI Agent; and 97G, Counter-SIGINT Specialist. Soldiers must meet all MOS qualification and "Time in Service (TIS) remaining" requirements outlined in AR 611-201 and AR 614-200. Application procedures for MOS 97B remain in effect. PERSCOM urges unit commanders to process and submit 97B applications promptly.

PERSCOM has established a reclassification target for FY 92 of 150 soldiers, but cannot accurately program targets beyond that. They will initiate mandatory reclassification only if target goals aren't achieved via soldier applications. POC for inquiries about this program is Staff Sergeant Collins, 98K Professional Development NCO, PERSCOM, DSN 221-0076.

98H and 98C Issues

For the first time in a long time PMOS 98C is over 100 percent strength, including all languages. Therefore, we closed the BEAR program to 98C's and withdrew the language reenlistment option.

PMOS 98H still has an airborne option with an SRB of 2A, and 1B for airborne qualified soldiers who reenlist for an airborne position. 98H has too few airborne soldiers, so the BEAR program remains open to qualified 98H's who want to become airborne. All SOCOM units and the XVIII Airborne Corps are allocated airborne 98H's.

98G Issues

The changing world situation has caused reductions in authorizations for German, Czech, and Polish linguists. PERSCOM approved an MP/MI Branch initiative for qualified soldiers to reclassify into 97B and 95D (CID Special Agent). The application board grants these MOSs by application only. Consult AR 611-201 to see if you meet the qualifications.

33Y Fast Track Program

MOS 33Y, Strategic Systems Repairer, will also face major authorization reductions between FY 92 and FY 94. As a result, PERSCOM opened the Fast Track Program to Skill Level 1 soldiers. Currently, PERSCOM is identifying soldiers eligible for this program and is sending them letters through their Personnel Service Centers and unit commanders listing available MOSs for reclassification. PERSCOM urges soldiers to respond with their choices quickly due to limited class seats in each specialty. Now that MOS 33Y is in Fast Track, these soldiers can reenlist immediately, even though they may not be in the reenlistment window. AR 601-280, Chapter 2, contains details about immediate reenlistment qualifications.

33Y10 soldiers have four Fast Track MOS choices: 29Y, Satellite Communications System Repairer; 35G, Medical Equipment Repairer, unit level; 96B, Intelligence Analyst; and 97B, CI Agent. AR 611-210, Chapter 2, and AR 614-200, Chapter 4, outline the qualifications and "TIS remaining" requirements.

PERSCOM has established a reclassification target of 85 soldiers for FY 92, but currently cannot accurately program targets beyond that. PERSCOM will initiate mandatory reclassification only if the goals aren't met.

POC for information about any of these programs is CMF 33 Senior Career Advisor, Master Sergeant Lois Sagmoe, DSN 221-0076.

THE COMMANDER'S Weather Brief

By Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett

To complete missions successfully, commanders must consider the effects of weather when making decisions. It is the S2's job to present weather information so commanders and their staffs can easily understand and retain it. In the usual weather briefing, the S2 stands before the commander with several view graphs and, in television news format, reads highs and lows, averages, and projections. This method is difficult and wearisome, especially for commanders who are already on the edge of information overload.

The briefer knows what needs to be said, but is there a concise way to say it? More importantly, is there a way to brief the weather so it's more understandable and memorable? If the commander walks away with an incomplete understanding of the effects of weather, then the briefer has failed to impart one of the most critical aspects of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

The invasion of Normandy is a good example of the importance of good, accurate weather briefings. On June 4, 1944, both General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Rommel got weather briefings. Rommel knew an Allied invasion of Europe was imminent. He also knew there was a 4-day window—from June 4 to June 7—when troops could successfully cross the English Channel. If the weather was bad at that time, the invasion would have to wait until July. Rommel's briefer, a Luftwaffe meteorologist, told him that a storm raging in the English Channel would continue unabated until June 8. Rommel assumed an invasion of Europe was impossible.

General Eisenhower's weather briefing was different. His briefer also told him the bad weather would continue, but that a break in the storm would occur on the night of June 5 and into the morning of June 6.

Based on their respective weather briefs, these commanders made critical decisions: Eisenhower ordered the invasion; and Rommel went back to Berlin. And with Rommel gone, his subordinate commanders were severely hindered in their efforts to mount a counterattack. This example shows that, based on their understanding of the weather, commanders do make critical decisions that affect the outcome of battles.

How can you present a concise, memorable weather briefing? I'd like to suggest the following format, which has worked well for me.

First of all, use one view graph instead of four or five. Use a "cartoon" format, where all the information is available at a glance. This allows the commander to see the information graphically (Figures 1 and 2). Remember, a picture is worth a thousand words. In fact, some psychologists suggest that humans retain up to 75 percent of the information they **see** but only 13 percent of the information they **hear**. Retention also increases when the briefer targets more than one of the listener's senses. For example, the briefer could use a graphic, and have the commander read pertinent data from the graphic as the briefer discusses it.

At first glance, Figures 1 and 2 appear to be too crammed with information. However, when briefed, the information flows quite easily. The charts are set up on an X - Y graph, with the 24-hour clock on the X axis and elevation on the Y axis. Use the historical chart in Figure 1 to brief weather trends over a period of time. It's especially useful for concept and decision briefings where the commander formulates his guidance. Use Figure 2 for daily briefings on meteorological changes.

Using Figure 1 and working clockwise from the upper left hand corner, remind the commander that all elevations are in feet, not meters. Indicate the highest points of terrain features in the area (Spessart) to give the commander a comparison with the heights of the expected cloud coverage. In this illustration, the commander can expect 3 miles or less visibility 30 percent of the time with clouds at 2,500 feet, and from one-half to 2 miles visibility 18 percent of the time with clouds at 750 to 1,000 feet. At a glance, the commander can see that valleys (Rhon) usually experience obscuration at the times indicated (in this case from 0400 to 1130). The average humidity, although lines are not drawn, is shown on the X axis time line. For example, the



Figure 1. Historical weather chart.



Figure 2. Weather chart with daily changes.

relative humidity is 89 percent at 0700, but 64 percent at 1500.

This format allows you to graphically equate percentages of illumination with the "fullness" of the moon. In this example, there is 40 percent illumination on May 1, increasing to 100 percent on May 10, and then decreasing to 97 percent on May 15.

Going now to the bottom right hand corner of Figure 1, you can see a time zone comparison indicating a 7-hour difference between Texas (Sierra) time and German (Bravo) time. It shows the difference between these two times and Zulu time. You can modify this portion of the graphic to suit any unit's location or information needs.

The rest of the figure graphically portrays prevailing wind speed and direction, average rainfall, and percentages of precipitation in rain or snow. In this example, you can expect precipitation 20 percent of the time, with rain accounting for 17 percent of it. And finally, the thermometer in the lower left hand corner shows the temperature average and recorded extremes.

Figure 2 uses the same basic format as Figure 1, with slight variations. It emphasizes light data along with the daily cloud coverage, precipitation, and so on. Beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) occur at the times indicated by the lines drawn to the X axis. As in Figure 1, the humidity is shown on the X axis time line, although only the time of the expected high is reported. At 0500 a frontal system is expected to arrive, bringing increasing cloud coverage along with intermittent showers between 1000 and 1300, and steady precipitation from 1500 to 2300 with decreasing ceilings.

The block in the lower right hand corner shows visibility in kilometers up to 7 km. A compass rose with the daily wind direction is next. This example shows a southeasterly wind at 5 knots between 0001 and 0500. But, as the frontal system approaches, the wind changes and increases velocity, becoming northeasterly at 1500. Finally, two thermometers indicate the daily high and low temperatures.

A cartoon graphic almost briefs itself. With this type of format, not only does the commander get the information, but his mind records an indelible image that he can recall as necessary. If the commander has questions that require a more detailed analysis or explanation, the cartoon graphic helps him select the questions. Rather than bombarding him with a myriad of details, let the commander select the specifics he wants explained further. This briefing format worked for 2d Armored Division, and it can work for you too.

Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett received his bachelor's degree from the University of Vermont in 1984. He is a graduate of the following courses: Armor Basic, Infantry Mortar Platoon Officer, Force Alignment Program III, CI, and MIOAC. He has served as Tank Platoon Leader and Mortar Platoon Leader, 5/68 Armor, 8th ID, Mannheim, Germany; Assistant Brigade S2, 3d Brigade, 8th ID; and DIVARTY S2 and DTOCSE Chief, 2d Armor Division. Captain MacJarrett is currently the S3, 163d MI Battalion (TE), 504th MI Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas.

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VANTAGE POINT *(Continued from page 2)*

of these plans are already well on their way:

- To fix dissemination, we developed a package for inclusion in the POM which will provide three upgraded, ruggedized TROJAN SPIRIT terminals per Force Package I corps, division, and EAC brigade, starting in FY 94 through FY 96. The thirteen existing Spirits will be upgraded prior to FY 94 if funding is available. We're also working with the Signal Center to articulate and integrate our future communications requirements into their objective communications architecture.
- To develop an implementable imagery processing and dissemination architecture, we already have funding to purchase five Mobile Imagery Transmission Terminals (MITT) in FY 92 and 93. When combined with five existing Tactical High Mobility Terminals (THMT), these will give 10 divisions the ability to receive secondary imagery dissemination (SID). The MITT is a downsized follow-on to the THMT. We also intend to provide the remaining two divisions an ASPO-provided SID capability, and all divisions a high quality printer so they can reproduce any imagery in sufficient quantities for their needs. We're also designing the Block I Joint STARS Ground Station Module (GSM). It will be able to receive live UAV video, as well as direct take from the Joint STARS radar, including both Synthetic Aperture and Moving Target Indicator. We're changing the GSM basis of issue plan (BOIP) to put it down to maneuver brigade.
- Our Army Intelligence Master and Modernization Plans had already called for a much more balanced capability across the disciplines for our corps and divisional MI units, rather than the SIGINT heavy units we have today. The Relook recommendations take that further, improving the balance and providing complementary capabilities vice redundant capabilities, at each echelon from division to EAC.
- To realign Army production responsibilities, we have articulated a Relook-developed Army production concept. It includes dedicated Army intelligence production elements in each Joint Intelligence Center or JIC and the creation of Corps MI Support Elements (CMISE) to reinforce each corps' collection and production capabilities. The bottom line is reduced redundancy and increased complementary intelligence production between echelons, with the corps, reinforced by the CMISE, assuming a complementary production mission.

In regard to the two deferred recommendations, we here have the lead in determining how to implement a new, viable linguist MOS for the Active Component. We are already well along in creating a new linguist MOS for the Reserve Component, MOS 97L. And we need to study how we can translate this concept into the Active Component, ensuring we properly take care of our soldiers in the process. We're also working closely with HQDA and INSCOM to develop a viable program with appropriate incentives to enable us to retain a much higher percentage of our linguists. FORSCOM has the lead, working with us, INSCOM, Office of the Chief of Army Reserves, National Guard Bureau, and DA, to develop viable solutions for the Reserve Component MI.

A New MIOAC

Our first new MIOAC kicked off on 1 October. It is specifically designed to—

- Incorporate lessons learned from JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and the combat training centers.
- Implement some of the Relook Task Force's key recommendations.
- Correct some long standing deficiencies in our Advanced Course, three of which are—
  - We were not properly focused on what tasks we needed our graduates to be able to perform.
  - We were putting students into area of concentration specific tracks without regard to the needs of the Army.
  - We were not teaching fundamental skills well enough, such as collection management, exploitation management, predictive analysis, and intelligence synchronization.

The new MIOAC, which took more than a year to develop, not only corrects these problems but also provides what I consider to be the most exciting training we have ever produced here at the Intelligence Center. Equally important, it truly complements and reinforces our recently revised MI Officer Basic and Transition Courses.

Colonel Bob Mangold's article in this issue discusses the new MIOAC, and the rationale for it, in detail.

Military Man in Space Program

The Army's MMIS experiment on board shuttle mission STS-44 is called "Terra Scout." The MMIS program is a component of the Space Test Program intended to determine military application of man's unique powers of observation and decision making in space. Terra Scout is an initiative of the Space Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, at the Intelligence Center. Terra Scout is an earth observation experiment, which used the skills of an expert imagery analyst to do the observations. The primary objective of the Terra Scout program is to explore the man/machine interface between skilled imagery analysts and current and advanced sensors.

The analyst was a payload specialist (PS) who has intensively studied the sites of interest. The primary PS was Chief Warrant Officer Three Tom Hennen. This is unique, as Chief Warrant Officer Three Hennen was the first warrant officer to go into space. His experience in imagery analysis and terrain and aerial observation, and his geology training are the reasons he was selected to perform this experiment. He used the Spaceborne Direct-View Optical System (SpaDVOS) to assist him in site analysis.

Each site had a prepared site packet which included selected maps and photographs. A number of sites had large resolution panels laid out in a grid pattern. These grids helped Chief Warrant Officer Three Hennen quantify the resolution limit from the shuttle cabin.

The follow-on experiment to this, Terra Scout II, will use the results of Terra Scout I, and evaluate the utility of hyperspectral imagery to support the tactical commander. The results of this second experiment will provide much needed data for possible sensor use on lightsats and UAVs. The upshot of all this is that our corps is actively involved in the MMIS and, in fact, has manned the first MMIS experiment and, hopefully, several more in the future.

Consolidation Construction

Finally, I have to tell you that all construction of the facilities to accommodate the move of the Intelligence School Devens is either on or ahead of schedule. Over $84 million in construction is currently underway, including six barracks, two dining facilities, three applied instruction buildings, and a self contained NCO Academy with billets and classrooms. An additional $50 million plus in new construction will start over the next 2 years, including a new $10 million UAV training facility in which we will train all services on the operation and maintenance of the UAV Short Range.

The bottom line is that these are exciting times for our branch and our corps. We are seeing the realization of a long term dream as new facilities begin to take shape, and the MI Relook recommendations give us great impetus going into a POM build to correct some long standing deficiencies. The potential benefits of the MMIS program are enormous, and we are positioning ourselves to capitalize on them. Only good can come from all of these developments from which our entire corps will be the beneficiary.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 5)

supply information needed to develop the vision.

- That intelligence can only be supplied by MI operatives who are linquistically and culturally intimate with their target society, which, in turn, means major changes in the way we handle our personnel.

Captain Larry A. Frost
Commander, HHC/319 MI BDE (EAC)
Seattle, WA

SME comment: *Captain Frost has done his homework and is on the money with his doctrinal points. However, he "read into" and perhaps misinterpreted Captain Collins' article. For example, Captain Frost is correct in pointing out the first LIC operational category is "support to insurgency and counterinsurgency," not "counterinsurgency operations." No questions there. However, I see nothing wrong with Captain Collins' statement that U.S. peacekeeping forces may prevent escalation. Captain Frost seems to assume that once peace is diplomatically achieved, there will never be any violations or incidents for the peacekeepers to observe and report.*

The whole premise of peacekeeping is that the presence of a neutral party will hopefully minimize these incidents and prevent them from escalating into a resumption of full-scale hostilities. Nowhere does Captain Collins imply that the peacekeepers will use force to achieve this.

In his letter, Captain Frost criticizes Captain Collins' use of the term "legitimacy of effort." FM/AFP 100-20 does list "legitimacy" as one of the LIC imperatives—not legitimacy of effort. Legitimacy, "is the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions." Captain Collins' use of the term "legitimacy of effort" is a doctrinal misquote. However, the definition of this LIC imperative implies: Those efforts the government or an agency carries out to achieve or retain that legitimacy.

Captain George Santiago
Chief, LIC Threat Section
Fort Huachuca, AZ

PROFESSIONAL READING

War In Korea: 1950-1953 by D. M. Giangreco (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 330 pages, $40.00.

With over 500 black and white photos, **War In Korea** would more appropriately be titled, "A Photographic History of the Korean War." However, this is not a criticism; by using this format, this book breaks new ground by effectively capturing the realities of a still largely misunderstood conflict. Despite the many photos and its voluminous size, the book's beauty is in its ease of reading: In just one evening's sitting a reader can finish the book and walk away with a vivid and thorough understanding of the war.

Each of the 10 chapters consists of two to three pages of commentary so vivid, it brings the Korean War to life with style and perspective. The author's keen sense of humor adds to the book's freshness. The opening paragraph serves as a case in point and sets the stage for an evening's worth of good reading: "Korea is roughly the size of California south of San Francisco or Italy north of Naples. It enjoys the pleasant climates of neither."

The photos themselves are the book's strong point. It's obvious the author, a **Military Review** editor, used great care to select his photographs. Through meticulous research, he developed photo captions with incredible amounts of information and detail. These photo captions, with their insightful commentary, carry the book's historical progression. The format reminds one of a television documentary.

In many ways, the author's coverage of the Korean War is especially informative. First, he treats the war in its totality as a UN action, with adequate coverage of the contributions of our allies and the communist forces. Second, he gives the naval and air campaigns equal treatment, and as a consequence, provides some of the book's most insightful reading. Third, the author thoroughly describes, in detail, the types of armored vehicles, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft used, including identification and performance characteristics.

This work ranks high on my list of Korean War books. At $40.00 it may not be a bargain, but for those genuinely interested in this conflict, it provides a general, yet solid, historical picture of the war. From this standpoint, it is **the book** to own.

Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello
Fort Bragg, NC

The New Eastern Europe: Western Responses by J. M. C. Rollo, et al (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), 137 pages, $14.95.

This short book discusses the economic and political problems the recently independent nations of Eastern Europe face, and how Western nations can help them recover. Rollo prescribes a gradual recovery for these nations as they move from strongly controlled economics to free market systems. The basis for this recovery is a series of social, legal, and political changes which must undergird the economic changes required. Many of the principles the author discusses can also be applied to other emerging independent states.

The author points out how the people must be willing to accept competition, some disorganization, unemployment, bankruptcy, and other troublesome aspects of a free market economy. Second, the public must make sure those who control the economy are willing to accept economic freedom. Third, each nation must find ways to stabilize its exchange rate. Finally, each nation should pass laws guaranteeing ownership of private property, the right to hire and fire, rights of creditors to demand payment, and legal rights of foreign investors.

These steps are intended to make foreign private investors feel secure about moving into these countries, since, foreign investors like IBM, GM, Coca-Cola, Exxon, and Matsushita will probably provide more permanent jobs and income than government could.

I strongly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in this topic and who is familiar with national and international economics.

Captain Robert McMichael
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Victor Six by David Christian and William Hoffer (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 256 pages, $19.95.

David Christian was America's youngest and most decorated officer in the Vietnam War. This autobiography covers both his Vietnam experience and postwar problems and glory.

The first section covers Christian's military career to include the unusual way he became a second lieutenant. He petitioned the Congressional Armed Services Commission to allow him to enter Officer Candidate School at the age of 18, and with no college background. On August 1, 1967, he won his appeal and became the youngest officer in the U.S. Army. Subsequently, like many other young lieutenants, he was shipped out to

Vietnam.

The book follows Christian through his tour in Vietnam from June 1968 until he was medically evacuated in January of 1969. Tragically, the napalm burns that covered over 24 percent of his body resulted from friendly fire. During his relatively short time in Vietnam, Christian adopted his own style of leadership, one that successfully changed a rag-tag reconnaissance unit known as the "shit burners" into one of the best small units in the war. Some of Christian's methods are the same ones we teach to today's young officers and NCOs.

In August 1969, at 20, Christian became the youngest captain in the Army. Shortly after, he retired on a disability pension. During his brief tour of duty, Christian was twice nominated for the Medal of Honor. Although both of these were downgraded, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, two Silver Stars, one Bronze Star, the Air Medal (for 25 combat assaults from a helicopter), seven Purple Hearts, the Combat Infantryman's Badge, two Vietnamese Crosses of gallantry (Vietnam's second highest award), and various other awards.

The second part of the book deals with Christian's return home and his work in gaining recognition for Vietnam veterans.

Eventually, by 1981, his prominence as a fighter for the rights of his fellow veterans brought him into serious consideration for the directorship of the Veterans Administration, a position he later turned down.

To his credit, Christian was instrumental in funding the Vietnam Memorial. He also was one of the founders of the United Vietnam Veterans Organization, which later merged with the Vietnam Veterans of America. Christian also ran several times for a local congressional seat in Pennsylvania, losing by mere percentage points. In January of 1990, he returned to Vietnam briefly en route to Cambodia to help the Cambodian government recover from the Khmer Rouge terror.

Victor Six is not a book that delves deeply into the horrors or the craziness of Vietnam. It does show us a small segment of the war as experienced by the youngest lieutenant there, and his postwar contribution to the cause of Vietnam veterans. This book is well worth reading. It reminds you of the true heroes, those who care about America.

Sergeant Brian D. Blodgett
Fort Drum, NY

Stormtroop Tactics, Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 by Bruce I. Gudmundsson (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 209 pages, $39.95.

Bruce Gudmundsson is a military historian at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. In this excellent, well written book, he shatters stereotypical ideas of the World War I-era German army, while providing a lively, entertaining story that says much to today's officer or NCO.

The author carefully relates the story of how the Germans developed innovative methods to condition their forces to be successful in the trench warfare that became the standard for the First World War. Interestingly, junior officers and NCOs, accustomed to developing and managing their own problem solving tools, conceived most of these innovations. This author does not uphold the popular stereotype of the narrow-minded, inflexible German military. There was, as Gudmundsson states, "a self-educating officer corps with a freedom to train their units as they saw fit...giving the German army a capacity for self-reform that no other military organization of the time could approach...."

This book pointedly illustrates what can be done when soldiers are encouraged to come up with innovative training methods.

This well-written, well-researched book is an enjoyable read for anyone interested in any aspect of military training. I highly recommend it.

Captain Richard Ugino, ARNG
Rochester, NY

Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck by Hans von Luck (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 301 pages, $24.95.

Once you start reading, it's hard to put this book down. For the general reader, it's an absorbing account of a highly-decorated German officer at war. For the specialized reader, it's an inside look at the German army of World War II.

The scope is sweeping since few Germans saw more of the war than von Luck. A professional soldier from a military family, he fought on most European fronts. He led reconnaissance units in the invasions of Poland, France, and Russia, and a reconnaissance battalion in North Africa. After 1944, he commanded a panzer grenadier regiment against the Anglo-American forces in France. In 1945, the Russians captured him.

The reader won't find detailed descriptions of tactics and weapons or heroic exploits. Instead, the author tells of people he encountered and places he traveled. The result is a human and personal story of the war.

Von Luck also appraises the soldiers he fought against offering penetrating observations on the British, Americans, and Russians. These statements are neither bitter nor apologetic. For example, he praises the Americans for their flexibility, while acknowledging their inexperience. More surprisingly, unlike many of his colleagues, he sees the Russians as humans, not subhumans. This view is all the more remarkable considering von Luck spent 5 years in a Russian labor camp.

Much of the book tells of the soldiers von Luck fought alongside. Most famous of these was Erwin Rommel. Serving closely under Rommel from 1940 to 1944, von Luck provides a unique portrait of him in battle and in deliberation. But, for von Luck, the real heroes are the soldiers of his units. He

wants his readers to know of their endurance, loyalty, and cohesion.

Von Luck is a master storyteller. In vivid descriptions and selective anecdotes, he recounts his adventures with wit and warmth. He has produced a satisfying and enlightening memoir that won't be soon forgotten.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace by Edward N. Luttwak (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 273 pages, $10.95.

The author is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is perhaps best known for his early 1980's articles that helped popularize the term and concept, "Operational Art," one of the cornerstones of AirLand Operations doctrine.

Luttwak makes an excellent case for three principles which guide both warfighters and policy makers when discussing strategy and its outcomes. The first is that strategy should not be influenced by common sense logic, because it has many more facets subverting the idea of reaching a conclusion through logic. The two dimensions of strategy are the vertical dimension (tactics and operations from the lowest levels through theater) and horizontal (political aspects and national considerations). Once the strategist understands these dimensions, he or she can acknowledge the truth of Luttwak's second axiom: "Restraint in pursuing success in war or peace can be the compelling rationale as culminating points are reached." I believe this axiom was proven in the 100-hour allied offensive ending the Gulf War.

The third and final principle is: "All levels of strategy must not only be understood but also work in conjunction" to achieve victory. About the Axis versus Allied efforts during World War II, Luttwak writes: "The Allies during World War II...had such a superiority at the 'Horizontal' level, especially in mobilizing their vast manpower and resources against the Axis, that by 1943 this superiority actually conditioned the vertical level from achieving further gains...in other point of fact, the absence of Japanese success at the horizontal level was so adverse, that the operational success at Pearl Harbor was actually worse than failure would have been...."

This book further emphasizes principles used in the Army's approach to strategic issues. It's an intelligent presentation by one of America's premier strategic writers. It's slightly dated in light of recent events, such as the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Still, it is practical enough to be interesting to the military reader.

Captain Richard P. Ugino, ARNG
Rochester, NY

LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century by Rod Paschall (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 166 pages, $23.00.

Whenever retired Army Colonel Paschall speaks on military matters, members of the special operations community ought to listen. He's an intelligent, articulate, experienced soldier with an impressive grasp of military history. His latest book attempts to project current trends into the next century and to chart "the likely course of low-intensity conflict over the next 2 decades."

The book is interesting, but lightweight, reading. Some parts are far too superficial, such as the discussion of Soviet special purpose forces. However, the text is well organized, the writing is fairly clear, and the insights are unique. The author covers the topic completely, but not comprehensively. The book's weakest points are its definitions and objectivity. Despite, or perhaps because of, its uneven qualities, this book is useful for starting arguments among special operations people; It's not useful for settling any of these. Regrettably, the book is far too short and lean to be worth the price.

Major William H. Burgess III
Fort Bragg, NC

Mafeking Diary: A Black Man's View of a White Man's War by Sol T. Plaatje, edited by John Comaroff with Brian Willan and Andrew Reed (London: James Currey, 1990), 139 pages, $24.95.

I strongly recommend the first half of this book for Boer War buffs or those interested in sieges. However, I found the book to be decreasingly useful as it progressed.

The South African city of Mafeking is the site of a critical siege during the Boer War from 1899 to 1902. This book presents the diary of the young South African who was the chief interpreter for the British court at Mafeking during the siege.

The first half of the book presents Plaatje's descriptions of the raids both sides made across the lines, the closing and consolidation of the encirclement, and the measures the British took to make their food and water last. As the siege continued, battle lines became more settled and the town's people settled into a wartime mode. The entries then become more repetitious and of less interest to the military reader. The diary ends before the British relief expedition arrives so the editors reconstruct the ending.

Overall, I cannot recommend this book wholeheartedly. I found the first part fascinating, but the last part is boring.

Captain Robert McMichael
Fort Huachuca, AZ

The Right of Innocent Passage and the Evolution of the International Law of the Sea. The Current Regime of "Free" Navigation in Coastal Waters of Third States by Francis Ngantcha (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 224 pages, $49.00.

In 1986, the U.S. Sixth Fleet sailed into the Gulf of Sirte south of latitude 32'30", a zone claimed by Libya. This action was in keeping with a declaration the U.S. delegation to the United Nations made in July 1985 which stated: "The U.S. rejects as an unlawful interference with the freedom of navigation and overflight and related high seas freedoms the Libyan claim to prohibit navigation in the Gulf of Sirte." When the Libyans interfered, the U.S. sank their ships and shot down their airplanes. In 1989, during another such U.S. passage, the Soviet Navy responded by "bumping" the U.S. Navy ships.

The territorialization of ocean space (for example, its division into zones of coastal state sovereignty and justification) has put a stop to the old system of free global maritime communications and transportation. Consequently, the international networks of trade and commerce, naval mobility, overflight, etc. have come to depend on the national maritime spaces of third states for purposes of passage.

The right of innocent passage is deeply rooted and universally recognized as one of the first rules of international law. Thus, independently of any convention, the right of innocent passage can be said to stand on its own merit. However, the concept is said to limit the sovereignty of states over their coastal waters. The writer focuses on the right of innocent passage as an accommodation made by international law to the exercise of coastal state sovereignty. Also, he examines the relationship between different categories of sea-going vessels and their entitlement to exercise the right of innocent passage.

The right of innocent passage for all ships is still controversial, especially the definition of noninnocent passage, the recognition of the possibility of declarations, and the innocent passage of warships or other "special" sea vessels.

The author is a member of the Cameroon Mission to the UN, and the book does have a Third World tilt. Nevertheless, it's a good textbook since it discusses all aspects of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and looks at other international conferences which have dealt with these issues. This is a specialized text which only students of international maritime law and international relations probably will find interesting.

Captain Gilles Van Nederveen
Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the Western Military Frontier by Robert M. Utley (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 226 pages, $19.95.

Although I'm not a fan of George Armstrong Custer, I found this book absorbing. Besides being an excellent biography, it illustrates the frustration of a conventional army fighting an unconventional war. For readers interested in Custer or the frontier army, this superb history is a must read. But I also highly recommend it to anyone who likes a good book.

Shortly after he died in his famous "Last Stand," Custer became a part of American folklore. Robert Utley tries to cut through the mystery surrounding the legend to discover the real Custer. While he modestly admits "failing to penetrate the enigma," he probably comes as close as any historian will.

Utley begins with a survey of the mythic Custer of folklore. Then, in an exciting chapter, he covers Custer's early life and brilliant Civil War career. Yet despite his superb record as a Union cavalry leader, Custer's career as an Indian fighter made him a legend.

Utley rates Custer as a good, but not great, Indian fighter. He gives fine accounts and reasoned critiques of the battles of Custer and his celebrated 7th Cavalry. Special attention goes to the Battle of the Little Bighorn. Utley presents an interesting and well-argued reassessment of the battle. Instead of the usual indictment of Custer's quest for glory and poor judgment, he asserts the defeat resulted from failure among Custer's subordinates and bad luck. This account and analysis of Custer's final battle alone make this book worthwhile.

Utley's portrait of Custer is amazingly well-balanced. He points out Custer's arrogance, obsession with money, infidelity, and dishonesty, but also praises his boldness, energy, and most of all, his combat leadership. These contradictions stemmed, Utley believes, from Custer's struggle with the immaturity of boyhood and the responsibilities of manhood.

One last word of praise for this well-crafted history goes to its publisher, the University of Oklahoma Press. The book has a good set of maps, which aid the reader. More impressive, though, is the book's superb set of photographs—the best set I've seen on Custer and his soldiers. All in all, this is a book not to be missed.

Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Assignment: Pentagon, The Insider's Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace by Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF Retired (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 271 pages, $35.00.

Assignment: Pentagon delivers. It lives up to its subtitle, and is the very best guide for anyone assigned to the Pentagon. Staff officers in any major service or joint headquarters also will find it relevant. It covers the Pentagon rules of the game and provides helpful hints not found in any other government publication. It explains the myths and realities of the workday and the

commute to and from a job in the Pentagon. It lays out several excellent rules of thumb for success and effectiveness, and warns of the major pratfalls that can derail an otherwise successful career.

This book provides a fascinating perspective on life in the largest office building in the world. It's a reference that anyone should read who's about to take on a Pentagon assignment or interested in effective and efficient staff work in a major headquarters.

Major William H. Burgess III
Fort Bragg, NC

Nuclear Strategizing, Deterrence and Reality by Stephen J. Cimbala (New York: Praeger, 1988), 306 pages, $49.95.

This book represents a theoretical approach to nuclear deterrence. Cimbala lays out a rationale relative to superpower deterrent relationships. Strategizing is what one does when one can't use strategy to explain the superpower nuclear standoff. Strategy is a four dimensional enterprise which has operational, societal, technical, and logistic components. None of these, Cimbala writes, apply to the current superpower balance.

The current balance of terror has nothing to do with the classic interpretation of balance of power. The balance of terror makes war between major powers unlikely, and therefore, only limited wars are possible with or without limited superpower participation. The superpower nuclear arsenals are the reason why the superpowers themselves will not resort to the use of force. Also, wars are no longer fought to deter future wars as they were in the balance of power system of interstate relations. Most nuclear armed countries have a shared interest in avoiding nuclear war and any direct clash of arms that could escalate into a nuclear war.

The author devotes much of the book to the differences between a prenuclear balance-of-war system and a postnuclear balance-of-terror system. One of the most important observations is nuclear weapons **do not** make conventional forces or conventional force balances less important. Exactly the opposite is true. Because nuclear weapons are used for coercion instead of fighting, conventional forces are the instruments with which war must be waged, if it is to be waged at all.

Cimbala discusses certain valid arms control options for the future: Reducing the probability of unintended war; refraining from deploying forces in a manner conducive to preemptive attack either by threatening attack or inviting it (reference to the MX basing in silos); knowing our limitations as they relate to arms control; and finally, most fundamental from a political standpoint, relating the theory of arms control to the theory of deterrence. The real nuclear deterrent in Europe lies first in the resistance the USSR can expect from NATO conventional forces and second from the possibility of escalation.

Cimbala has produced a text which illustrates the problems of the current nuclear superpower relationship. He's one of the first authors to show we can no longer use normal strategy and past political power relationships and theory to define the current bipolar world.

Captain Gilles Van Nederveen
Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

Incursion by J. D. Coleman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 294 pages, $19.95.

There has long been a gap in the chronicles of U.S. tactical and strategic operations. This book fills the gap by recounting the 1st Cavalry Division's 1969-1970 interdiction operations in the region northwest of Saigon and the subsequent cross-border operations into Cambodia. This is the first book to examine these events in detail. The author was assigned to the 1st Cavalry through much of the period. He mixes vivid descriptions of battles, interdiction operations, and personalities with a broader look at political pressures exerted at the national and international levels during that time.

The book is extremely well-written and easy to read. The author has combined the right amount of detail to put the reader on the scene during tactical operations with an above-the-battle look at outside events. While it does not claim to be an examination of strategic decision making, it does provide enough background to enable the reader to understand the wider view of events that impacted directly on the field soldier. This view of frontline action and world-level politics is instructive, particularly for readers not familiar with the situation in that time period as U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam, while the war was still going on.

The author writes in a straightforward, clear fashion and advises readers of his biases early on. It's easy to tell whom he admires (General Abrams, most 1st Cavalry commanders, all 1st Cavalry troops) and whom he doesn't (General Westmoreland and the II Field Force Commander, Lieutenant General Ewell, among others).

The book suffers from the long delay between the actions described and the publication date. More pictures of soldiers the author credits for "rising to the occasion" during battle and sketches of those fights would have given the book greater impact. Nevertheless, it's well-illustrated and well-written, sometimes riveting in its terse description of courageous fighting. I highly recommend it to those interested in following events in Vietnam.

Colonel John B. Haseman
U.S. Defense Attache
Jakarta, Indonesia

142d Military Intelligence Battalion (Linguist)

The crest is a silver colored metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches wide. It consists of a black vertical dagger on a silver beehive with blue details, all on a silver scroll inscribed "INTO ALL THE WORLD" in black letters. Above the scroll are two bunches of silver sego lilies. Silver and oriental blue are the colors traditionally associated with MI. The dagger symbolizes military preparedness, and the globe and motto represent the unit's worldwide capabilities and responsibilities. The beehive and sego lilies are symbols associated with Utah, the unit's location.

The Utah Army National Guard's 142d MI Battalion (Linguist) is one of the Total Force's new linguist battalions. These battalions have the unique mission of supplying trained Army linguists for worldwide missions, thus contributing to the overall effectiveness of the Total Army concept.

Activated as a 54-member interrogation company in February 1960, the 142d has grown to 370 people. The 142d now includes 97E's, 97B's, and 98G's. They focus on the European and Southwest Asian theaters.

Most of the battalion's linguists have lived and worked on a day-to-day basis in foreign countries. They are familiar with the economics, history, and languages of these countries. Also, many linguists continued their education by earning bachelors' degrees in their languages. This level of education, cultural background, and professionalism have produced competent and motivated soldiers.

The 142d strives to recruit qualified linguists. The fact that the unit can give them good language training and the opportunity to perform worldwide language missions is the key to retention and recruiting. Soldiers often have the opportunity to train in their target languages.

The 142d soldiers have responded enthusiastically to active military support missions where both MOS and language skills were needed. During the 1980's, the battalion supported DA, FORSCOM, INSCOM, National Guard Bureau, and overseas commands.

The 142d MI Battalion mobilized nearly one quarter of its soldiers during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Four Arabic/Farsi sections provided HUMINT and SIGINT support to the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, and also supported the postwar humanitarian mission. Company A, 142d MI Battalion, provided interrogation support to two joint interrogation facilities. A company section also supported a document exploitation mission in Dhahran.

The 142d MI Battalion has the language and MOS experience to support any mission and it continues to maintain the highest standards for trained MI linguists. The battalion's worldwide mission opportunities allow its soldiers to continually increase their proficiency. The unique excellence of the 142d MI Battalion contributes to the overall effectiveness of the Total Force concept.

Graphic: PV2 Jeff Preuninger

In a December 13, 1991 ceremony at the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., Mr. Ed Rybak was awarded Germany's highest peacetime service award, the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. The event was hosted by the German Ambassador who conveyed to Mr. Rybak the German Government's heartfelt gratitude for his immeasurable contributions to U. S.—German relations. The award was a fitting tribute to Mr. Rybak's more than 30 years of close cooperation and coordination with the German Government. Also, upon Mr. Rybak's recent retirement, he was awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service in recognition of his 39 years of outstanding service to the U. S. intelligence community.

Ed Rybak has been one of the most distinguished members of Army Intelligence. Upon his retirement this fall, Mr. Rybak was serving as Director of Operations, 66th MI Brigade with significant liaison responsibilities with German agencies.


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